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laws that govern the private sector, however, often draw artificial and untenable
lines between "conduct" and "status " to preclude protections for individuals or
couples who face censure because oftheir intimate choices. This Article exposes
how these arguments have been used to justify not only discrimination against
the lesbian and gay community, but also discrimination against heterosexual
couples who engage in non-marital intimacy or non-marital childrearing.
During the 1980s and 1990s, several state supreme courts held that landlords
who refused to rent to unmarried couples were responding to unprotected
conduct (i.e., non-marital intimacy) rather than engaging in impermissible
discrimination on the basis ofmarital status. Similar arguments are made today
in cases concerning same-sex couples who are denied wedding-related services
or unmarried pregnant women who are fired. This Article argues such decisions
misconstrue the relevant statutory language, and it shows how modern
constitutional doctrine should inform the interpretation of private
antidiscrimination law to offer more robust protections for intimate liberties.
This Article also addresses whether antidiscrimination protections related to
intimacy can be enforced despite objections premised on religious beliefs. Some
courts, as well as the Trump Administration, have suggested that statutes
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status or sexual orientation
serve less "compelling" interests than provisions prohibiting race
discrimination. This argument is deeply flawed. Courts have long recognized
that statutes intended to eliminate discrimination serve compelling purposes,
even when they address factors that do not trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. The compelling nature of antidiscrimination laws related to
intimate liberties should be especially obvious: They protect individuals'
freedom to make fundamentally important choices that are central to personal
dignity and autonomy.
INTRODUCTION
Individual choices regarding marriage, procreation, and sexual intimacy are,
in the words of the Supreme Court, "central to personal dignity and autonomy."'
In striking down bans on same-sex marriage and same-sex sodomy, the Court
relied primarily on substantive due process doctrine, but it recognized a
"synergy" between guaranteeing personal liberties and advancing equality
norms under the Equal Protection Clause.2 Leading constitutional law scholars
I Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citing and quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)); see generally Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (arguing that Constitution protects rights to
intimate associations).
2 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575
("Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by
the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the
latter point advances both interests.").
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have likewise long recognized the interplay between these doctrines.3 But, in
interpreting the antidiscrimination laws that govern the private sector, courts
often draw artificial and untenable lines between "conduct" and "status" to
preclude protections for individuals or couples who face censure because of their
intimate choices. This Article exposes this phenomenon as a problem that recurs
in multiple contexts. It argues that such decisions misconstrue the relevant
statutory provisions, and it shows how modem constitutional doctrine should
inform the interpretation of private antidiscrimination law to offer more robust
protection for intimate liberties. This is essential for both the threshold question
of whether antidiscrimination protections apply and the secondary question of
how to balance the interests served by such protections against religious liberty
claims.
The stakes in addressing this issue are high. The right to marry a same-sex
partner is rather hollow if the marriage itself is then used as grounds to be
penalized at work.4 So too is a right to engage in sexual intimacy outside of
marriage or to make other choices around family formation. This Article
analyzes three contexts in which intimate choices are made publicly visible:
unmarried couples who seek to rent apartments together, same-sex couples who
seek goods or services connected with a wedding, and unmarried women who
are pregnant. In all three contexts, individuals and couples routinely face
discrimination for their intimate choices. And when they do, they often have no
legal rights. Shortly after this Article is published, the Supreme Court will decide
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,5 a case
brought by a bakery that was fined for discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation because it refused to make a wedding cake for a gay couple. 6 The
bakery alleges its rights to free speech and freedom of religion were violated.7
Commentary on this case typically presents it as an example of a "clash"
between religious rights and gay rights.8 This framing obscures a key issue. In
3 Leading explorations include Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1491 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447
(2004); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16
(2015); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 HARv. L. REV. 747 (2011). Some of these authors applaud the Court's shift towards
emphasizing the liberty aspects of these claims, while others critique the change.
4 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2016), rev'd on
other grounds, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
6 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, T 3, 370 P.3d 272, 276, cert.
granted, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
7 Id.
I See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Cake Case Takes Court Back to the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2017, at Al (describing Masterpiece Cakeshop as "clash" between antidiscrimination
laws and religious freedom claims).
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many states, a gay couple denied services would have no recourse in the first
place; the "gay rights" side of the "clash" would be non-existent. A ruling in
favor of the bakery will make this problem worse-but even if the Supreme
Court rules in favor of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the problem will
persist.
As a threshold matter, plaintiffs who face discrimination because of their
choices regarding intimacy must identify an antidiscrimination law that applies.
The federal laws that prohibit discrimination by employers, landlords, and
businesses serving the public do not explicitly address discrimination on the
basis of marital status or sexual orientation.9 That is also the case in
approximately half of the states.10 Thus, in these jurisdictions, plaintiffs
generally can proceed only if they can show that the action violates a prohibition
on sex discrimination." This problem is relatively straightforward, though
crucially important, and it obviously supports enacting explicit protections or
clarifying that such discrimination is actionable under existing discrimination
laws.12
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (employment); id. § 3604 (housing); id. § 2000a(a)
(public accommodations). But cf 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012) (making it illegal to
discriminate on basis of marital status in providing access to credit).
10 See Maps of State Laws and Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN http://www.hrc.org/
state-maps (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (identifying state laws prohibiting discrimination on
basis of sexual orientation in various contexts, including housing, employment, and public
accommodations); sources cited infra note 56 (identifying states that prohibit discrimination
on basis of marital status in housing, employment, and public accommodations).
" At the time of publication, the law is unsettled as to whether discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is inherently a form of sex discrimination. See Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp.,
850 F.3d 1248, 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding no), petition for certiorari pending; Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 77 (2d Cir.) (holding no), reh'g granted, No. 15-03775,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853
F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding yes, at least under Title VII). Explicitly
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would clarify the legal rule and
serve the important expressive purpose of indicating such discrimination is unlawful and
improper; on the other hand, many of the proposed bills providing such explicit protections
include exceptions that are not found in Title VII. See generally Mary Anne Case, Legal
Protections for the "Personal Best" of Each Employee: Title VII's Prohibition on Sex
Discrimination, the Legacy ofPrice Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect ofENDA, 66
STAN. L. REv. 1333 (2014) (arguing sexual-orientation specific legislation might undercut
existing protections for gays and lesbians and for others who depart from gender norms).
12 I also support explicit protections from discrimination on the basis of gender identity, to
the extent that such discrimination is not already prohibited by existing laws. Cf Mia Macy
v. Eric Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *10 (Apr. 20, 2012)
(concluding discrimination on basis of gender identity is form of sex discrimination).
However, such discrimination is generally not triggered by choices regarding personal
intimacy with another person and thus is somewhat distinct from the issues that are my
primary focus in this Article.
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My focus in this Article, however, is on a subtler, but equally dangerous,
problem that has been largely overlooked. Even where there are statutory
protections addressing intimate liberties-such as prohibitions on
discrimination on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation, or pregnancy-
courts often draw untenable distinctions between "status" and "conduct" that
severely curtail the efficacy of such provisions.13 For example, during the 1980s
and 1990s, several state supreme courts held that landlords could refuse to rent
to cohabiting couples because that decision simply reflected disapproval of
"conduct" (i.e., non-marital intimacy), rather than impermissible marital status
discrimination. 14 In more recent years, courts have similarly reasoned that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is illegal sex discrimination, but
discrimination against a pregnant woman premised on her having engaged in
non-marital sex is permissible.15 And in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case and
similar cases, businesses have argued that their refusal to provide wedding-
related services to same-sex couples is not a form of unlawful discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, but rather simply disapproval of same-sex
marriage; they routinely cite the earlier housing cases in support of these
arguments. 16 In this last context these claims have been largely unsuccessful,
and this precise issue will not be before the Supreme Court.17 However, the
argument might well find purchase as other lower courts in more conservative
regions weigh in.
13 This Article is the first to demonstrate how courts have relied on untenable distinctions
between status and conduct in multiple contexts concerning the application of
antidiscrimination law to intimate liberties. My analysis builds on earlier scholarship that
looks at discrete aspects of this case law. See generally, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Marital
Status Discrimination 2.0, 95 B.U. L. REv. 805, 808-10 (2014) (critiquing restrictive reasoning
employed in housing discrimination cases concerning cohabiting couples as part of argument
for more robust protections against discrimination for non-marital families); Nicole
Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for Title VII Protection, 46
WAYNE L. REv. 1, 38-44 (2000) (arguing for more robust protections against marital status
discrimination in employment); Jessica Clarke, Marriage at Work (Oct. 24, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (critiquing ways in which employment law
privileges marriage, including court decisions that permit employers to fire unwed pregnant
employees). A recent essay by Melissa Murray, Rights and Regulation: The Evolution of
Sexual Regulation, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (2016), discusses and critiques public employers'
discrimination against their employees on the basis of intimate choices, arguing that it is in
tension with modem constitutional doctrine. Professor Murray's essay does not address the
extent to which private employees are far more vulnerable than public employees to such
discrimination because the Constitution does not apply at all.
14 See infra Section III.A.
's See infra Section II.C.
16 See infra Section III.B.
1 See infra text accompanying note 259 (explaining that Supreme Court has no authority
to review Colorado courts' interpretation of Colorado statutory law).
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I show that these arguments rest on an artificial distinction between "status"
and "conduct" that should be rejected. Sexual orientation is defined by actual or
desired partners for sexual intimacy. Marital status is defined by choices
regarding whether and when to marry. And pregnancy, including non-marital
pregnancy, is the physical manifestation of sexual intimacy and choices
regarding procreation and contraception. In other words, antidiscrimination
provisions that reference these "statuses" should be understood to necessarily
incorporate protection for "conduct." When the first wave of housing cases
concerning cohabiting couples were decided, courts often justified their cramped
interpretation of the antidiscrimination protections as a means of harmonizing
the statutes with other state laws that criminalized non-marital intimacy.' 8 But
now, it is clear that these anti-fornication and anti-cohabitation statutes are
unconstitutional.1 9 These earlier precedents should be repudiated so that their
unduly constrained reasoning is not exported into cases emerging today
regarding same-sex marriage and unmarried pregnancy.
This Article also makes an important contribution to the other pressing
question currently being litigated in courts at all levels: how antidiscrimination
provisions that address intimate liberties should be balanced against claims for
religious exemptions. In some of the early housing discrimination cases, courts
suggested that statutory provisions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
marital status were less "compelling" than antidiscrimination prohibitions
related to race, and thus that they should not be enforced against landlords who
claimed religious objections. 20 The Supreme Court recently intimated a similar
hierarchy,21 as did the Department of Justice on behalf of the United States in an
amicus brief submitted in the currently pending Masterpiece Cakeshop case.22
Attorney General Jeff Sessions distributed a memorandum to all executive
departments and agencies which similarly suggests religious freedom should be
prioritized above almost any other governmental interest.23 These arguments are
'8 See, e.g., N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, ¶ 37, 625 N.W.2d 551,
562 ("The cohabitation statute and the discriminatory housing provision are harmonized by
recognizing that the cohabitation statute regulates conduct, not status.").
" See, e.g., Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05-CVS-267, 2006 WL 3103008, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Aug. 25, 2006) (holding state's anti-cohabitation law unconstitutional under Lawrence);
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2015) (holding state's anti-fornication law
unconstitutional under Lawrence).
20 See infra Section III.A.2.
21 See infra text accompanying note 125 (discussing Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)).
22 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 32-33,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-
111) (arguing laws targeting "race-based discrimination" are sufficiently compelling to
survive heightened First Amendment scrutiny but that laws targeting discrimination on basis
of sexual orientation are not). Leading civil rights organizations submitted amicus briefs that
vigorously disputed this claim. See sources cited infra note 284.
23 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 97:20832088
2017] INTIMATE LIBERTIES AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
deeply flawed. Courts have long recognized that statutes intended to eliminate
discrimination serve compelling purposes, even when they address factors that
do not receive strict scrutiny under constitutional law. The importance of
enforcing antidiscrimination laws related to intimate liberties should be
especially apparent. The Supreme Court has made clear that individual choices
regarding marriage, procreation, and sexual intimacy are "fundamental" liberties
protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 24 These liberties are
significantly curtailed if individuals face the loss of jobs, housing, or other
services on the basis of their intimate choices.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the evolution of
constitutional doctrine over the past fifty years and how it now protects
individuals' autonomy to make choices regarding sexual intimacy, procreation,
and marriage without the threat of state-based sanction. Rates of non-marital
childrearing have risen dramatically, particularly for racial minorities and those
with relatively low levels of education. Part II sketches the way in which status
and conduct arguments have been deployed in earlier constitutional and
statutory contexts, with a particular focus on gay rights cases. Part III describes
and critiques courts' interpretation of antidiscrimination protections in the
context of cohabiting couples seeking housing, same-sex couples seeking
services, and unmarried pregnant women facing adverse employment actions.
Part IV begins to develop the normative case for expanding antidiscrimination
protections for intimate liberties. Constitutional doctrine emphasizes that
criminalizing intimate choices invites private discrimination. The opposite is
equally true: permitting private discrimination can undermine individuals'
freedom to exercise fundamental liberties. The pregnancy discrimination cases
are particularly shocking in this respect; supervisors apparently felt no
compunction in demanding that employees marry partners or end long-term
relationships to maintain their jobs. Even in cases concerning denial of services
or housing, where presumably it is easier for individuals to find alternative
providers, being rejected on the basis of choices that are so integral to personal
identity causes significant injury that antidiscrimination law should address.
These cases make it abundantly clear that when businesses are empowered to
exclude, that liberty comes at the expense of the dignity and autonomy of
others-their employees, tenants, and the public at large.
I. SEXUAL INTIMACY, PROCREATION, AND MARRIAGE
A. "Fundamental" Liberties
Until the middle of the twentieth century, American criminal and family law
enforced strict rules on sexual intimacy. 25 Sexual intercourse could only occur
24 See infra Section I.A.
25 Rules at common law were somewhat more flexible, but the early American colonies
and later states all prohibited non-marital sexual intimacy. See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN,
UNMARRIED COUPLEs, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (2010) (discussing colonial laws
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lawfully within marriage; such sex, and any children that resulted from such sex,
were "legitimate." 26 This was a legal term of art with specific consequences
under a web of family and inheritance laws, and it was also a normative
assessment of propriety.27 Sexual intimacy outside of legal marriage, even
sexual intimacy between consenting adults, was criminalized as illegal
fornication (sexual intercourse between unmarried persons), adultery,
cohabitation (couples living together as if married), 28 and the sex-specific crime
of seduction (seducing unmarried women, of a previously "chaste character,"
under the promise of marriage). 29 Parentage law followed and enforced the
expectation that "proper" procreative sex was, by definition, marital sex.
Children born to unmarried parents were stigmatized as "bastards," and, until
the late 1800s, they were not considered children or heirs of anyone. 30
Subsequently, women who gave birth to children outside of marriage were
recognized as legal mothers of their children, but non-marital fathers still had no
claim to parental rights.31
Criminal law enforced the expectation that sex was at least potentially
procreative by criminalizing the use of contraception, 32 abortion,33 and non-
criminalizing adultery and fornication).
26 See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature ofParenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260,2272-73 (2017)
(describing how Anglo-American legal system historically understood "parentage as a
relationship defined through marriage" and that any child born to married woman was
presumptively "legitimate").
27 See id. at 2273-75 (discussing custody and property rights that flowed from legitimacy
under common law and explaining that illegitimate children did not have recognized legal
relations with either parent).
28 See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 25, at 12-18. Additionally, common law marriage was
used to transform such illicit activity into a "legal" marriage, with all its concomitant
responsibilities. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History ofActing Married,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 969 (2000).
29 See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 5 (2012).
30 See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 197, 218 (1985); NeJaime, supra note 26, at 2272-73.
3' NeJaime, supra note 26, at 2280; see also In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970)
(explaining that non-marital fathers had no rights unless they went through legal proceeding
similar to that used in adoption or guardianship proceeding).
32 Birth control was legal through much of the nineteenth century, but beginning in 1873,
Anthony Comstock successfully led a broad-based crusade against birth control as a means
of enforcing Victorian ideals of moral purity. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED
FAMILIES v. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 78 (2010).
Some laws distinguished between contraception for birth control purposes and contraception
for limiting the spread of disease. In practice, this meant that men could use condoms but
women did not have access to a legal form of contraception.
33 At common law abortion was legal until "quickening," but abortion became more
generally criminalized by 1880. See, e.g., LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME:
WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1973, at 14 (1997).
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procreative forms of sexual intimacy between men and women.34 And criminal
law prohibited non-heterosexual intimacy, both as a derivative consequence of
limiting sex to marriage and limiting marriage to the union of one man and one
woman, and more directly through anti-sodomy laws. This framework
established what Professor Melissa Murray has called the "criminal-marriage"
binary, under which there was-literally-no legal space in which non-marital
sex could occur.35 Notwithstanding the criminal prohibitions, couples still had
sex outside of marriage. 36 But couples making the choice to engage in non-
marital intimacy, or to take steps to ensure that sexual intimacy did not result in
procreation, faced at least a nominal risk of criminal prosecution, medical harm
to themseleves in the case of illegal abortions, and, for some at least, shame
inspired by a legal regime that characterized their intimate choices as improper
and immoral.
In the past fifty years, this legal landscape has been completely remade. Under
modem constitutional jurisprudence, procreation, sexual intimacy, and marriage
are each recognized as "fundamental" liberties, and state efforts to regulate
individual choices in these spheres are carefully scrutinized. 37 This
constitutional revolution began with Griswold v. Connecticut,38 which held that
married couples had a constitutionally protected right to access contraception, 39
and Loving v. Virginia,40 which struck down bans on interracial marriage. 41
The Court quickly expanded this doctrine to protect aspects of non-marital
intimacy. The first wave of decisions did not directly address the
constitutionality of criminal laws that proscribed non-marital intimacy itself;
34 Anti-sodomy laws in many states prohibited both same-sex and different-sex couples
from engaging in oral or anal sex; in some states, the laws only addressed same-sex couples.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-71 (2003).
35 Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal
Construction oflntimate Life, 94 IOWAL. REv. 1253, 1292-93 (2009) (arguing that historically
all sexual expression was forced into one of two categories: "acceptable sexual behavior,
entitled to the protection, privacy, and recognition offered by family law (marriage)" or
"unacceptable criminality suitable for prosecution and punishment (crime)").
36 See, e.g., CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 32, at 65 (reporting that between 1947 and 1957,
thirty percent of brides gave birth within eight months of wedding, and adoption rate doubled
from what it had been in earlier decades).
37 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 ("[Olur laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education."). There is some variation in the particular words
with which the Court describes the level of scrutiny required, but generally a state must prove
that the regulation at issue furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored
to achieve that objective.
* 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
* Id. at 485-86.
40 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41 Id. at 12.
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they simply mitigated the collateral consequences of the conduct.42 The Court
expanded the concept of privacy first announced in Griswold to hold that
unmarried individuals could not be denied access to contraception43 or
abortions.44 The Court also held that the benefits that flow from the child-parent
relationship cannot be categorically denied to non-marital families,4 5 that non-
marital children were owed child support,46 and that they had the right to inherit
from their natural parents under intestacy laws.47 The Court also recognized the
corollary concept that men who father a child outside of wedlock have, in at least
some circumstances, a constitutionally protected interest in being recognized as
legal fathers.48 Many of these cases rested on Equal Protection Clause grounds,
with the Court reasoning that even if states could criminalize non-marital
intimacy, these other legal rules, and their often harshly punitive effects, were
42 See generally, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the
Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REv. 1277 (2015) (describing this body of constitutional
law).
43 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding right of privacy protects right
of "individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"
(emphasis added)). For an insightful exploration of Eisenstadt's impact, as well as its
unrealized potential, see Susan Frelich Appleton, The Forgotten Family Law of Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 28 YALE J.L. & FEM1NISM 1, 3-4 (2016) (arguing that Eisenstadt "heralded a new family
law that would be more inclusive, liberatory, sex-positive, and feminist than its
predecessors").
4 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding parents generally
could not absolutely veto minor's choice to obtain abortion because "[m]inors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights").
4 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (holding denial of
wrongful death benefits to non-marital children after death of their father unconstitutional);
Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968) (holding denial of
benefits to mother after death of her non-marital child unconstitutional); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding denial of wrongful death benefits to non-marital children
after death of their mother unconstitutional).
46 Gomez v. Perry, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (holding state law that granted legitimate
children right to claim child support but categorically denied that right to illegitimate children
unconstitutional).
47 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775 (1977) (holding state law that permitted
illegitimate children to inherit only from their mothers but permitted legitimate children to
inherit from both parents unconstitutional); cf Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978)
(upholding statute that included specific proof standards for non-marital children to inherit
from their fathers).
48 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1979) (holding statute allowing
unmarried mothers, but not unmarried fathers, to withhold their consent to adoption
unconstitutional); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that denying
unmarried fathers hearing on parental fitness in child custody cases, while granting hearing
to all other parents, violates equal protection rights).
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not sufficiently rationally related to the states' claimed objective of reducing
non-marital sex.49
At the same time as this constitutional doctrine was developing, state
legislatures substantially revised the criminal and family law codes to likewise
provide more robust support for individual choices around intimacy. The
influential Model Penal Code, first promulgated in 1955, recommended that
criminal law not be used to punish "morality-based offenses or victimless
crimes," such as the criminal prohibitions on consensual non-marital sex.50 By
1978, only fifteen states still criminalized fornication and only sixteen states still
criminalized cohabitation, and prosecutions under these laws were extremely
rare.51 Parentage law was likewise substantially reformed to affirm and
recognize rights of non-marital parents, often going beyond the constitutional
minimums announced by the Supreme Court.52 Divorce law was liberalized to
permit no-fault divorce,53 and states and the federal government directed new
energy to enforcing child support obligations on non-marital and divorced
parents.54 And finally, as discussed more fully in Parts II and III, legislatures
amended antidiscrimination laws to preclude some discrimination related to
decisions around intimacy, procreation, and marriage. In 1978, Congress
explicitly prohibited pregnancy discrimination in employment,5 5 and during the
1970s and 1980s, about half of the states amended their antidiscrimination laws
49 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) ("It would be plainly
unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an
unwanted child as punishment for fornication, which is a misdemeanor under [the state's
laws]."); Weber, 406 U.S. at 173 (rejecting state's claim that its interest in protecting
"legitimate family relationships" justified limiting wrongful death benefits to marital families
on grounds that "it [cannot] be thought ... that persons will shun illicit relations" because
their children might one day be denied benefits).
50 BOwMAN, supra note 25, at 15; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
1 BOWMAN, supra note 25, at 15; see generally JoAnne Sweeny, Undead Statutes: The
Rise, Fall, and Continuing Uses ofAdultery and Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 127 (2014) (tracing progression of adultery and fornication laws and lack of enforcement
over time). Such statutes were sometimes invoked in other proceedings, such as alleged
welfare fraud cases, divorce and custody proceedings, or efforts to establish paternity to
facilitate collecting child support. See generally Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing
Patterns ofBehavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275 (198 1).
52 See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 26, at 2285-2316.
5 See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce
and Its Aftermath, 56 CIN. L. REv. 1, 4-14 (1987) (discussing rapid spread of no-fault divorce
laws between 1969 and 1987).
5 See generally, e.g., Maureen A. Pirog & Kathleen M. Ziol-Guest, Child Support
Enforcement: Programs and Policies, Impacts and Questions, 25 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 943 (2006) (discussing history of child support enforcement from 1979-2004).
5s Pregnancy Discrimination Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (2012).
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to explicitly prohibit discrimination in the private sector based on an individual's
marital status.56
In the 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas,57 the Court squarely addressed the
constitutional limits on the state's ability to proscribe intimacy.5 8 As will be
familiar to many readers, the case was a constitutional challenge to a Texas law
that criminalized same-sex sodomy.59 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, struck down the law, holding it was an unconstitutional infringement
on the "autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct." 60
Two aspects of the Court's reasoning are important to the argument that
follows. First, the Court was quite clear that it was interpreting the Constitution
to offer robust protection for both homosexual and heterosexual individuals'
intimate choices, including the choice to engage in non-marital intimacy.61 The
Court rested this conclusion on the constitutional developments discussed
above, characterizing the early decisions concerning unmarried individuals'
access to contraception and abortion as establishing that "the reasoning of
Griswold could not be confined to the protection of rights of married adults." 62
It emphasized that the constitutional infirmity was not simply a matter of fit
between the statute and the stated or presumed objectives of a law. Rather,
quoting from a more recent abortion decision, the Court characterized "personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, [and] family
relationships" as "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy" and
accordingly choices that are "central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
56 See Nancy Leung, Negative Identity, 88 S. CAL. L.REv. 1357, 1406-07 (2015) (reporting
that twenty-two states and District of Columbia prohibit discrimination on basis of marital
status in employment, and twenty-four states prohibit discrimination on basis of marital status
in housing); Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws,
60 ST. Louis U. L.J. 631, 638 (2017) (reporting that seventeen states and District of Columbia
prohibit discrimination on basis of marital status in public accommodations); see also Robert
Mueller, Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: A Free Exercise Defense
to Marital Status Discrimination, 74 B.U. L. REV. 145, 145 n.2 (1994) (identifying and
discussing state housing laws); Porter, supra note 13, at 15-16 (identifying and discussing
state employment laws). These lists are largely consistent, but there are a few states that
prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status in one or two of these contexts but not
all three. Additionally, there are errors in at least some of these lists. For example, some of
the "housing" discrimination statutes referenced (e.g., Florida and Nebraska) in Leung are
actually employment discrimination statutes. Leung, supra note 56, at 1407 n.308.
Nonetheless, I include all of these references so that researchers have access to the most
comprehensive lists I was able to locate.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 Id. at 564.
5 Id. at 562.
6 Id.
6' Id. at 567.
62 Id. at 566.
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Amendment." 63 Thus, the Court deemed it essential to address the due process
argument directly (and overrule its prior precedent holding a ban on sodomy
permissible) to foreclose any "question[ing]" about whether the prohibition
could be valid if it addressed conduct of both same-sex and different-sex
participants.64
The Court's emphasis that decisions around consensual intimacy were
constitutionally protected was significant not only for gays and lesbians, but also
for different-sex couples who likewise challenged traditional community norms
around intimacy, most typically by engaging in non-marital sex or non-marital
childbearing. This conduct, like same-sex intimacy, remained criminal in some
states, and it likewise was the basis for collateral consequences under civil laws,
even though it was rarely the grounds of criminal prosecutions. 65 Lawrence thus
changed the marriage-crime binary more generally by creating a "space" for
sexual intimacy that was neither regulated by marriage nor by criminal law.66
Lower courts relied on Lawrence to strike down lingering bans on fornication
and cohabitation.67
The second aspect of the Lawrence decision that is particularly important to
the analysis that follows is the interaction the Court identified between liberty
and equality claims. Although the Court declined to formally rest its decision on
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court emphasized that principles of equality
and the substantive guarantees of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
are "linked in important respects," such that its decision on the "latter point
advances both interests." 68 Lawrence, which explicitly and affirmatively
protected the liberty to engage in same-sex intimacy, thus served to delegitimize
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and on the basis of formerly
stigmatized forms of sexual intimacy more generally.
Viewed through this lens, Obergefell, the case in which the Supreme Court
held bans on same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional, is both a step forward
and a step backward. Like Lawrence, Obergefell asserts-and indeed
63 Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
1 Id. at 574-75. Justice O'Connor concurred on equal protection grounds, reasoning that
there was not a sufficiently rational basis for prohibiting only same-sex sodomy, but she would
not have held that the statute violated due process. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
65 See BOWMAN, supra note 25, at 15-16.
1 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 13, at 578-84.
61 See BOWMAN, supra note 25, at 18-20.
68 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. Commentators have examined this interplay between
equality and liberty claims both before and after Lawrence. See sources cited supra note 3. I
have previously written of the interplay specifically in the context of marriage. See generally
Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1375 (2010) (arguing that access to marriage implicates fundamental rights branch of
equal protection jurisprudence which incorporates liberty interests typically protected under
Due Process Clause).
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develops-the idea of a "synergy" between liberty and equality.69 The opinion
demonstrates that many of the Court's prior decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, and contraception invoked both due process and equal protection
principles. 70 It observes further that denying same-sex couples the right to marry
worked a particularly "grave and continuing harm" because of the "long history
of disapproval" of gay and lesbian relationships.71 Permitting same-sex couples
to marry helps discredit the ongoing disapproval of same-sex intimacy.
But in addressing this harm, Obergefell reaffirms the equally longstanding
disapproval of non-marital families. The substantive analysis opens with the
confident proclamation that "[fjrom their beginning to their most recent page,
the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage,"
and that "[t]he lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised
nobility and dignity to all persons." 72 The Court asserts that marriage protects
children of same-sex couples from the "stigma" 73 and "humiliat[ion]" 74 of being
raised by parents who are not married, and it suggests that the panoply of state
benefits enjoyed by married couples is appropriate because marriage is the
"keystone of our social order." 75 The Court makes clear that it believes that the
choice to engage in marital intimacy merits far more protection and respect than
the choice to engage in non-marital intimacy.76
I believe that same-sex couples who choose to marry have a constitutionally
protected right to do so.77 However, like many other commentators, I am
concerned by Obergefell's implicit denigration of couples (same-sex and
different-sex) who choose not to marry.78 In Lawrence, the individual autonomy
69 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (describing "synergy" between
two protections).
70 See id. at 2603-04.
71 Id. at 2604.
72 Id. at 2593-94.
73 Id. at 2602.
74 Id. at 2601.
7 See id.
76 Id. (suggesting approval for extent to which society supports marriage by offering
married couples recognition, rights, and benefits and concluding same-sex couples should
enjoy these same advantages).
7 See generally Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 68 (arguing that denying same-sex couples
equal access to civil marriage violates Equal Protection Clause); Deborah A. Widiss,
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex
Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007) (arguing justifications for
same-sex marriage rest on sex-based stereotypes that violate constitutional guarantees against
sex discrimination).
71 I previously critiqued the way in which the Court similarly denigrated non-marital
families in United States v. Windsor. See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families
and (or After?) Marriage Equality, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 547 (2015). Other scholars have
made similar observations. See generally, e.g., Clare Huntington, Obergefell's
Conservativism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FoRDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015); Melissa Murray,
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to make intimate choices on one's own terms was celebrated as "transcendent"
in and of itself.79 But in Obergefell, the Court dramatically re-characterized this
shift as merely moving an individual from "outlaw" to "outcast."8 0 To be truly
respected, Obergefell suggests, personal intimacy should be expressed within
marriage. This assertion is deeply out-of-step with the modem American life-
and by suggesting that those who engage in non-marital intimacy and non-
marital procreation may be appropriately scorned as "outcasts," even if not
criminalized as "outlaws," the Court's rhetoric may have far-reaching harms.
B. Changing Demographics
During the period of transformative constitutional and statutory developments
detailed above, the lived experience of American families likewise experienced
seismic shifts. In 1960, seventy-two percent of adults were married, and eighty-
five percent of adults had been married at some point.8 1 Importantly, at this time,
marriage rates were also relatively consistent across race and class; for example,
black men and women were almost as likely as white men and women to be
married. 82 Couples sometimes engaged in pre-marital sex, but when an
unplanned pregnancy occurred, the most common response was a "shotgun"
marriage prior to the baby's birth;83 less common options included abortion or
Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 1207 (2016); Douglas
NeJaime & Reva Siegel, What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said, in What Obergefell
v. Hodges Should Have Said (Jack Balkin ed., 2017 forthcoming), available at
https://ssm.com/abstract-2849644 [https://perma.cc/DLV4-Y5AY]; cf K.T. Matsumura, A
Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 1509, 1512-13 (2016) (arguing liberty interests
identified in Obergefell should support right not to marry, including right to maintain non-
marital statuses that include some benefits and responsibilities of marriage). Obergefell's
denigration of non-marital families arguably confirms claims that LGBT advocates' focus on
achieving marriage equality would undermine the advocacy for more robust support for non-
marital families generally. See, e.g., NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIEs UNDER THE LAW 9-10 (2008).
9 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
s0 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 ("Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not
achieve the full promise of liberty.").
81 D'VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., BARELY HALF OF U.S. ADULTS ARE
MARRIEI-A RECORD Low 1-2 (2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/barely-
half-of-u-s-adults-are-married-a-record-low/ [https://perma.cc/Y846-GFKD] (providing
demographic data on how marriage changed from 1960 to 2010).
82 See R. Kelly Raley, Megan M. Sweeney & Danielle Wondra, The Growing Racial and
Ethnic Divide in U.S. Marriage Patterns, FUTURE OF CHILDREN 89, 93-95 (2015).
83 See Stephanie Ventura & Christine A. Bachrach, Non-Marital Childbearing in the
United States, 1940-99, Oct. 18, 2000, NAT'L VITAL STATS. REPS., at 10,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5QZ-TZAA]
(reporting that in 1960, sixty percent of unmarried women who became pregnant were married
before giving birth).
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adoption. 84 In 1960, only five percent of all children were born outside of
marriage.85
All of that looks very different today. Barely half of adults are currently
married,86 and roughly half of all marriages end in divorce.87 Non-marital sex is
entirely commonplace; almost all adult Americans-ninety-five percent-have
exercised this liberty.88 Nearly half of all adults in their thirties and forties have
lived with a partner (without being married) for at least a portion of their lives.89
Few non-marital couples faced with an unplanned pregnancy now rush to marry;
rather, most couples either have the child without marrying or choose to abort.90
Forty percent of all births in the United States are now to unmarried women,91
about half of whom are living with their partner at the time of the birth.92 It is
increasingly common to have children with multiple partners, resulting in
8 See id. at 12 (reporting that before 1973, 8.7% of children born to unmarried women
were relinquished for adoption).
85 CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED WOMEN: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN
AND YOUTH 3 (2016), https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/75_Births_
toUnmarriedWomen.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2TL-KMMP].
86 COHN ET AL., supra note 81, at 1.
87 See Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of the
Research in the 2000s, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 403, 405 (2010) (collecting studies suggesting
that nearly forty to fifty percent of marriages end in divorce).
88 Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954-2003, 122 PUB.
HEALTH REPS. 73, 75 (2007) (finding that as of 2002, ninety-five percent of Americans had
premarital sex by age forty-four).
89 See PAUL TAYLOR, CARY FUNK & APRIL CLARK, PEW RESEARCH CTR., As MARRIAGE
AND PARENTHOOD DRIFT APART, PUBLIC IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL IMPACT 1 (2007),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2007/07/01/as-marriage-and-parenthood-drift-apart-public-
is-concerned-about-social-impact/ [https://perma.cc/67W3-WBFS]; see also CASEY E.
COPEN, KIMBERLY DANIELS & WILLIAM D. MOSHER, NAT'L HEALTH STATISTICS REPORTS,
FIRST PREMARITAL COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF
FAMILY GROWTH 1 (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RV9W-5ACE].
90 Approximately forty-two percent of women with unintended pregnancies choose to
terminate the pregnancies through abortion. GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN
THE UNITED STATES (2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-
unintended-pregnancy-us_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U77-5QXT]. About fourteen percent of
women who obtained abortions were married, and thirty-one percent were cohabitating.
JENNA JERMAN, RACHEL K JONES & TSuYBOSHI ONDA, GUTrAMACHER INST.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. PATIENTS IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 5 (2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/reportpdf/characteristics-us-abortion-
patients-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB2H-E5KL].
9' CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, supra note 85, at 3. This rise in part reflects a decrease in
marital births during this time period. Ventura & Bachrach, supra note 83, at 3.
92 Sheela Kennedy & Larry L. Bumpass, Cohabitation and Children's Living
Arrangements: New Estimates from the United States, 19 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 1663, 1676
(2008).
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blended-and frequently shifting-family configurations that depart
dramatically from the "traditional" nuclear family of a married couple living
together with their shared biological children.93 And, of course, gay men and
women no longer need to fear criminal prosecution if they engage in sexual
intimacy.94 They can, since Obergefell, legally marry in any state, and
demographers estimate that approximately one half of all same-sex couples in
the United States are currently married.95
These averages mask significant divergence by race, class, and education
level. Marriage rates rise dramatically as household income and education level
rise, 96 and non-Hispanic white women are much more likely than black or
Hispanic women to get married.97 The non-marital birth rate slopes in the
opposite direction.98 Currently, seventy-one percent of black women and fifty-
three percent of Hispanic women who give birth are unmarried; the birth rate for
non-Hispanic whites, by contrast, is twenty-nine percent.99 A pioneering
qualitative study by Katheryn Edin and Maria Kefalas of poor and working class
unmarried mothers (including black, white, and Hispanic women) living around
Philadelphia, and a follow up study by Edin and Timothy Nelson of unmarried
fathers in the same area, help explain the individual choices behind the
93 See Cherlin, supra note 87, at 406-08 (reviewing research showing increased rates of
"multipartnered fertility" and high rate of dissolution of both married and unmarried
cohabiting U.S. couples).
94 See Lawrence v. Texas, 529 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (voiding laws that prohibit same-sex
sexual conduct).
95 CHRISTY MALLORY & BRAD SEARS, THE WILLIAMS INST., ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES ONE YEAR AFTER OBERGEFELL 2 (2016),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Estimating-the-Economic-Impact-
of-Marriage-for-Same-Sex-Couples-One-Year-after-Obergefell-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6H
J-XC72]. Twenty-five percent of these marriages took place in the year following the
Obergefell decision. Id.
96 See generally, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: How
INEQUALITY Is REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014) (discussing studies showing
correlation between education levels and marital rates as part of larger argument about how
economic inequality affects marriage).
* Raley, Sweeney & Wondra, supra note 82, at 17.
98 RACHEL M. SHATTUCK & ROSE M. KREIDER, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORTS,
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENTLY UNMARRIED WOMEN WITH A
RECENT BIRTH: 2011, at 4-5 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BZY6-2YBS] (showing steady decline in rate of non-marital births as
household income and educational levels increase); see also CARBONE & CAHN, supra note
96, at 13-20 (discussing disparities in educational attainment and class); Clare Huntington,
Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Non-Marital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167,
185-91 (2015) (discussing studies showing these disparities in more detail).
9 See CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, supra note 85, at 3.
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statistics.100 Edin and Kefalas found that many of the women they interviewed
had made a reasonable assessment that the men with whom they interact-
intimately and non-intimately-would not meet the responsibilities imposed by
marriage.101 Nonetheless, the women were unwilling to forego sexual intimacy
or motherhood.1 02
These changes in family form, and changes in the norms around sexual
activity, abortion, contraception, and parenting outside of marriage-as well as
the Supreme Court decisions that protected these choices as fundamental
liberties-are highly controversial. A 2011 Pew Research Report assesses public
acceptance of seven areas in which family structure and practice has changed
markedly in the past half century. 10 3 The subjects studied include the number of
single women having children, the number of unmarried couples raising
children, and the number of gay and lesbian couples raising children.'1 The
report found sharp divisions of opinion as to the merits of these changes.
Approximately a third of all Americans accept each of these changes as either
good for society or making no difference, a third of all Americans reject each of
these changes, and a third of all Americans are classified as "skeptical"-a group
who accepts each of these changes except single motherhood.105 The divisions
are very stark and they make clear why this latest phase in the culture wars has
been so divisive.
Not surprisingly, there are clear patterns in terms of who falls into which of
these three groups. Religious observance, as measured by attendance at religious
service, has the largest effect, with more than half of those who attend service
weekly or more classified as "rejecters," meaning they characterize all of these
changes as bad for society. 106 Among "rejecters," opposition is strongest among
those who identify as white evangelicals.1 0 7 This finding accords with a 2007
10 See KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE
INNER CITY 24-27 (2013); KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY
POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 5-6 (2005).
101 EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 100, at 196-210; see also TAYLOR, FUNK & CLARK, supra
note 89, at 4 (reporting that for never-married parents and cohabitors, "marriage appears to
represent an ideal-albeit an elusive, unrealized one").
102 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 100, at 130-31, 202-03, 208-10.
103 PAUL TAYLOR, RICH MORIN & WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PUBLIC
RENDERS A SPLIT VERDICT ON CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE 1 (2011),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/02/Pew-Social-Trends-Changes-In-Family-
Structure.pdf [https://perma.cc/83UU-L233].
1" Id. (reporting other trends studied were people living together without getting married,
mothers of young children working outside home, interracial marriages, and more women
never having children).
105 Id. at 1-2.
106 Id. at 1.
107 Id. at 6 (noting that sixty-two percent of socially conservative white Evangelicals and
more than forty percent of Protestants were rejecters).
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study, which similarly found a wide divergence based on religiosity on moral
disapproval of pre-marital sex and non-marital parenting.108 There are also,
again not surprisingly, strong differences based on party affiliation, with
Republicans far more likely than Democrats or independents to characterize
these changes as bad for society 09 and to believe that premarital sex and non-
marital child bearing is morally wrong. 10
Finally, the Pew Report found that respondents classified as "rejecters"
expressed (slightly) higher levels of opposition to the rise in single motherhood,
unmarried couples raising children, and unmarried people living together, than
to gay and lesbian couples raising children.1 1 This accords with commentators
who have suggested that the rapid growth in non-marital childrearing may be
more threatening to many religious understandings of marriage than same-sex
marriage. 112 As the so-called "conservative" argument for marriage equality
framed it, gay and lesbian couples simply sought access to the venerable
institution of marriage; other than the sex of the parents, the model of family
presented was quite traditional.1 13 Non-marital and blended families are, in some
ways, far more disruptive to traditional norms. As discussed above, this tension
was at the heart of the Court's reasoning in Obergefell where the Court held that
bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional in part because otherwise
108 TAYLOR, FUNK & CLARK, supra note 89, at 55-56 (reporting that approximately seventy
percent of Protestant white evangelicals believed that it was always or almost always wrong
to engage in pre-marital sex or bear children outside of marriage).
109 TAYLOR, MORIN & WANG, supra note 103, at 7 (finding that fifty-four percent of
Republicans, seventeen percent of Democrats, and thirty-one percent of political independents
were rejecters).
110 TAYLOR, FUNK & CLARK, supra note 89, at 55-56 (finding disparity of approximately
twenty percent between Republicans and Democrats on opinions regarding both premarital
sex and having children outside of marriage).
"' TAYLOR, MORIN & WANG, supra note 103, at 4-5 (reporting that eighty-seven percent
of rejecters viewed gay and lesbian couples raising children as bad for society, compared to
ninety percent or higher in other categories).
112 See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 625 (2015); cf PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE GROWS, EVEN AMONG GROUPS THAT HAD BEEN
SKEPTICAL 1-2(2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/06/26/support-for-same-sex-marria
ge-grows-even-among-groups-that-had-been-skepticall [https://perma.cc/ZT3K-NX7C]
(reporting June 2017 poll that found rapid growth in support for same-sex marriage among
younger white evangelicals).
113 See, e.g., JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT Is GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 85, 105 (2004) ("America has a problem with too few
marriages, not too many. One would think that encouraging a whole new population to tie the
knot would be a step in the right direction."); ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 111,
185 (1995) ("Why would accepting that such people [homosexuals] exist, encouraging them
to live virtuous lives, incorporating their difference into society as a whole, necessarily
devalue the traditional family?").
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children of gay and lesbian parents would be forced to bear the "stigma" of
having unmarried parents.1 14
C. Religious Objectors
Expanding constitutional protections for intimate liberties relating to sexual
intimacy, procreation, marriage, and related changes in family form has been
sharply polarizing. In the wake of Lawrence (and shifting sentiment among the
public as a whole), lawmakers can no longer simply rely on community morals
as the basis for criminalizing such conduct. Instead, those who object to these
changes now more typically frame their complaints in the language of religious
liberty, and they have sought recourse under the First Amendment and statutes
that protect religious freedom. To be clear, I believe most individuals and
organizations advancing these claims do so in good faith, in the sense that they
have a sincere religious belief that certain intimate choices are improper or
immoral. The difficult question is how to balance their claims to religious
freedom against the liberty and equality interests of those whose intimate
choices depart from traditional norms. This Section discusses recent Supreme
Court decisions that have dramatically expanded the scope of protections for
religious objectors. The pending Masterpiece Cakeshop case may go even
further. This Section also describes actions the Trump Administration has taken
to likewise prioritize religious liberty claims over other interests, and proposed
federal and state legislation that would provide even broader exemptions.' 15
The first significant change concerns the scope of the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and similar state laws.' 16 This law permits
"persons" to challenge generally applicable laws that interfere with their
exercise of religion. The respondent then must make a showing that applying the
law in this context serves a compelling interest and that it is narrowly tailored to
114 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (arguing that children of same-sex
couples "suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser").
11s Although organized opposition, such as boycotts, has been an effective countermeasure
to many such bills, one would expect that some would gain traction since Republicans have
unified control of the federal government and twenty-five states. See State Government
Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICS, https://ballotpedia.org/
State-government trifectas [https://perma.cc/33VP-JZRF] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see
generally John J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party
Responsiveness, 93 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 821 (1999) (discussing how unified control
significantly increases likelihood of legislative enactments).
"6 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012); State Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/M5SD-XPAX] (identifying twenty-one states that have enacted state
statutes similar to federal RFRA).
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achieve that objective.' 17 In 2014, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 18 the
Supreme Court held for the first time that for-profit businesses could bring
RFRA claims.' 19 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito on behalf of
five justices, concluded that Hobby Lobby, a large for-profit chain of craft
stores, did not need to comply with the Affordable Care Act's requirements that
employer-provided medical insurance fully cover the cost of all FDA-approved
contraception methods. 120
Hobby Lobby thus permits (at least) any closely held business to claim that a
law substantially burdens its religious beliefs, and therefore that it should be
excused from compliance. 121 The four dissenting Justices highlighted the risk
this broad interpretation of RFRA posed to antidiscrimination protections,
identifying past cases in which corporate defendants had cited religious beliefs
as justifying discriminatory acts. 122 Notably, two of the three cases cited
involved objections to intimate liberties: a health club that refused to hire gays
and lesbians, as well as anyone who lived with a different-sex partner without
being married; and a photography business that refused to photograph a lesbian
couple's commitment ceremony. 123 The third case involved race
discrimination. 124
117 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) ("Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
" 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
"1 Id. at 2794-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Until this litigation, no decision of this Court
recognized a for-profit corporation's qualification for a religious exemption from a generally
applicable law, whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA."); see also, e.g., Autocam
Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding for-profit secular
corporation could not bring RFRA claim), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Congesta Wood
Specialties v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir.
2013) (same), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
120 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775, 2782 (holding that providing contraception
"substantially burden[s]" companies' exercise of religion and that it is not least restrictive
means of achieving government's objectives).
121 Hobby Lobby stated that its holding was limited to "closely held" companies, see id.,
but the rationale supporting the interpretation the Court endorsed (looking to the U.S. Code's
"dictionary" provisions which define "person" as including corporations), id. at 2768, makes
no distinctions among different kinds of corporations, suggesting this limitation may be
challenged in future litigation. That said, as a factual matter, it will most likely be difficult for
publicly held corporations to demonstrate that they are governed by religious beliefs.
122 Id. at 2804-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123 See id. at 2804-05 (citing In re Minnesota ex rel. McClure, 370 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn.
1985); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53).
124 See id. at 2804 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945
(D.S.C. 1996)).
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In response to the dissent's concerns, the majority opinion stated merely that
that the government's interest in eradicating race discrimination was compelling
and that prohibitions on race discrimination are narrowly tailored to achieve that
objective; it did not make a comparable assertion about the importance of
eradicating sex discrimination, let alone marital status discrimination or sexual
orientation discrimination. 125 The particularity of this response arguably
heightens, rather than mitigates, concerns that antidiscrimination protections
related to sexual liberties might be vulnerable. Importantly, the Court
characterized the least-restrictive means standard as "exceptionally
demanding." 126 A federal court has already held that a funeral home-officially
non-denominational, but owned by a man with strong conservative Christian
beliefs-could use the RFRA as a defense in a case brought by a transwoman
fired after she informed her boss she would be transitioning.1 27 A wide variety
of businesses, from small florists to large fast-food companies, embrace
conservative Christian values in their management. 128 Accordingly, this is likely
to be the first of many such cases.
The second recent Supreme Court case that expands religious exemptions
from antidiscrimination laws is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. EEOC.129 In this case, the Court recognized, for the first time, a
"ministerial" exception to employment discrimination laws, which precludes
courts from addressing claims concerning the employment relationship between
a "religious institution and its ministers." 30 This general concept had long been
recognized in the lower courts, but a circuit split had developed as to how
125 Id. at 2783. The Court assumed without deciding that the government's interest in
providing access to contraception was compelling, but indicated support for arguments
pressed by Hobby Lobby and asserted the Affordable Care Act's mandate failed this standard.
Id. at 2780.
126 Id. at 2780.
127 See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 856-57
(E.D. Mich. 2016) (holding that requiring funeral home to permit employee who was
biologically male to follow female dress code would be "substantial burden" on funeral
home's ability to conduct business in accordance with its sincerely held religious beliefs),
appeal pending. In this case, the court assumed that the government interest in addressing sex
discrimination is compelling but it held that the EEOC failed to show how enforcing
antidiscrimination provisions was the least restrictive means of obtaining this objective. Id. at
859-60.
128 See, e.g., Kim Blhasin & Melanie Hicken, 18 Big Companies that Are Intensely
Religious, BusiNEss INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/17-big-
companies-that-are-intensely-religious-2012-1 [https://perma.cc/9SJK-EF6Y]; The Call of
the ICCC: For a People in the Workplace, INT'L CMUSTIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
iccc.net/about [https://perma.cc/JAQ5-VRA8] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (describing
international organization of Christian businesses that includes members in over seventy
countries).
129 565 U.S. 171, 181 (2012).
1' Id. (emphasis added).
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broadly the concept of "ministers" should be understood.131 In Hosanna-Tabor,
the Court declined to adopt a "rigid formula for deciding when an employee
qualifies as a minister," but it made clear that it understood it to be a relatively
expansive concept. 132
The "ministerial" exception gives religious organizations an incentive to
designate as many of their employees as "ministers" as possible, as this can
create a shield against liability for race, sex, disability, or other forms of
prohibited discrimination, as well as potentially against tort claims, breach of
contract claims, or union grievances. In one recent case, a Catholic school
argued that a non-Catholic technology coordinator, who had no religious
training and no involvement in religious classes or services, should be deemed
a "minister" simply because she served as a "role model" for students. 133
Although the district court rejected that argument, the diocese in question, and
several other Catholic dioceses, have since designated all of their school teachers
as "ministers."1 34 They have also begun requiring all employees to sign contracts
with extensive "morals" clauses agreeing to conform to the Church's rules on
matters such as sexual intimacy and reproductive technology. 135 Thus, under this
expanded doctrine, a wide range of employees for religious organizations who
might be disciplined or fired for their intimate choices would lose the right to
challenge such claims as violating antidiscrimination law.
The Trump Administration has (in its first ten months) taken several actions
that further erode antidiscrimination protections and heighten the risk that
individuals will face censure for exercising their intimate liberties. Most
directly, President Trump issued an executive order committing to promote "free
131 Id. at 202-04 (Alito, J., concurring) (listing circuits and their various standards for
defining "ministers").
132 Id. at 190.
133 Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-cv-00251, 2013 WL 360355, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (concluding that because plaintiff was not Catholic and accordingly not
permitted to teach Catholic doctrine she "cannot genuinely be considered a minister").
114 Patrick J. Reilly, Are Catholic Schoolteachers 'Ministers'?, NAT'L CATHOLIC REGISTER
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/are-catholic-schoolteachers-ministers
[https://perma.cc/YUG6-BCYE] (identifying new policies adopted by Cincinnati, Columbus
(Ohio), Honolulu, Oakland, and San Francisco dioceses).
13 Dennise Donohue & Dan Guernsey, THE CARDINAL NEWMAN SOCIETY, FAITH AND
MORALS LANGUAGE IN CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHER EMPLOYMENT DOCUMENTs: BEST
PRACTICES BRIEF 21-23 (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cardinalnewmansociety/wp-
content/uploads/Faith-and-Morals-Best-Practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CA8-Y25T]
(discussing expanded use of morals clauses as "best practices"). Indeed, at least one church
official has taken the position that anyone in the building-even a cook-serves as a role
model for students and therefore should not be retained if unmarried and pregnant. See Netta
Barak-Corren, Does Antidiscrimination Law Influence Religious Behavior? An Empirical
Examination, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 983 (2016); cf Complaint at 4, Maudlin v. Inside Out,
Inc., No. 13-cv-00975, 2014 WL 1342883 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2014) (alleging Christian
community center fired cook because she became pregnant without being married).
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speech and religious liberty."1 36 Although the order itself was rather vague in
scope,1 37 the memorandum issued by Attorney General Sessions to implement it
is quite sweeping, prioritizing religious liberty over virtually every other
governmental policy objective. 138 In many respects, the memorandum pushes
the boundaries of typical understandings of federal law. For example, it
articulates a very broad interpretation of what kind of organizations could
qualify as "religious entities" permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion-
such that they could choose to only hire co-religionists. 139 The memorandum
also asserts that federal agencies generally may not condition receipt of a grant
or a contract on relinquishing any protections for an organization's religious
beliefs. 140 This suggests that the Administration may well take the position that
the government could not require social services agencies receiving government
money to serve all families, including families-such as gay- or lesbian-headed
116 See generally Exec. Order No. 13798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 9, 2017).
137 See id. at 21,675 (requiring executive departments and agencies "to the greatest extent
practicable and to the extent permitted by law, [to] respect and protect the freedom of persons
and organizations to engage in religious and political speech"). Originally, President Trump
reportedly considered issuing a memorandum that explicitly included more controversial
language modeled on the proposed First Amendment Defense Act. See, e.g., Sarah Posner,
Leaked Draft of Trump's Religious Freedom Order Reveals Sweeping Plans to Legalize
Discrimination, THE NATION (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/leaked-draft-
of-trumps-religious-freedom-order-reveals-sweeping-plans-to-legalize-discrimination/
[https://perma.cc/7G8Q-AYB3].
138 Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen. 1 (Oct.
6, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1001891/download [https://perma.cc/Y86Z-Q5F3] ("In the United States, the free exercise of
religion is not a mere policy preference to be traded against other policy preferences. It is a
fundamental right."); id. at 2 (emphasizing that individuals and businesses "do not give up
their freedom of religion by participating in the marketplace"); id. at 4 (asserting that any
government action that "compels an act inconsistent with [religious] observance or
practice . . . will qualify as a substantial burden on the exercise of religion" under RFRA).
139 See id. at 12a (asserting religious entity exemptions apply to any for-profit or non-profit
organization that is "organized for religious purposes and engages in activity consistent with,
and in furtherance of, such purposes"). The memorandum's sole support for this test is an
amicus brief submitted by the United States in a Ninth Circuit case. See id. (citing Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633
F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 08-35532)). However, the court in that case rejected the
government's proposed test in favor of a more stringent standard. See Spencer, 633 F.3d at
724 (per curiam) (explaining that although judges failed to agree on single standard, they did
agree that, at minimum, it includes requirement that it "does not engage primarily or
substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts"); cf
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Comm. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (articulating
nine factors to consider, including whether it operates for profit).
140 Sessions Memorandum, supra note 138, at 8.
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families or cohabiting couples-that do not match the organization's religious
beliefs.141
Other actions taken by the Administration that jeopardize intimate liberties
include broadening considerably the range of businesses that may seek to be
excused from providing contraception to their employees;1 42 reversing the prior
government position as to whether discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is a form of sex discrimination;1 43 and, as noted above, submitting an
amicus brief on behalf of Masterpiece Cakeshop in the pending Supreme Court
case, which contends that religious liberty claims necessarily supersede statutory
prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination.'" The Administration has also
backed away from transgender rights on several fronts.1 45 Many of these actions
will no doubt be challenged in court. Even if courts reject some, it seems
apparent that the Trump Administration will continue to prioritize the claims of
those who object on religious grounds to the intimate choices of others.
Proposed legislation could skew this balance even further in favor of religious
objectors. The most prominent legislative response to Obergefell has been the
First Amendment Defense Act ("FADA").1 46 In the 114th Congress (2015-
2016), this bill was co-sponsored by almost seventy percent of the
141 Cf Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield v. Illinois, No. 201 1-MR-254, 2011
WL 3655016, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2011) (permitting state to refuse to renew
government contract to provide adoption services on grounds that Catholic Charities refused
to work with unmarried cohabiting couples).
142 See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47792, 47792 n.1, 47835 (adding 45
C.F.R. § 147.132) (permitting any business or insurer to be excused from providing
contraception "based on its sincerely held religious beliefs" or other "moral convictions").
143 See Alan Feuer, Justice Department Claims Gay Workers Aren't Protected by Major
Civil Rights Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2017, at A17 (describing brief submitted in pending
Second Circuit case as "taking a stand against a decision reached under President Barack
Obama").
1 See Brief for the United States, supra note 22, at 32-33 (arguing laws targeting
discrimination on basis of sexual orientation are not compelling enough to justify
infringement on religious liberty rights).
145 See, e.g., Sari Horwitz & Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Ends Workplace Protections for
Transgender People Under Civil Rights Act, WASH. POsT (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/trump-administration-asks-court-to-
toss-out-challenge-to-military-transgender-ban/2017/10/05/3819aec4-a9d5-11 e7-92dl-
58c702d2d975_story.html [https://perma.cc/VYL4-49KG] (describing Trump
Administration's change in policy on whether Title VII protects individuals against
discrimination on basis of gender identity and earlier ban on transgender people serving in
military).
16 First Amendment Defense Act, S. 1598, 114th Cong. (2015); First Amendment
Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015).
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Republicans, 147 and supported by then-candidate Donald Trump. 148 FADA
would prohibit the federal government from taking any "discriminatory action"
against a person (defined to include both for-profit and non-profit businesses)
for acting in "accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction that
marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman, or
that sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage." 49
"Discriminatory action," in turn, is defined to include withholding, terminating,
or denying federal grants, contracts, or licenses; imposing any kind of tax
penalty; and revoking tax exempt status.150
Even though FADA has not been reintroduced in the current Congress, it has
served as a template for numerous state bills, including a law enacted in
Mississippi in spring 2016.151 Additionally, the Sessions memorandum may
achieve many of FADA's objectives, in that it suggests that religious beliefs,
including those related to family form, will generally be prioritized over other
government policies or objectives. Most discussions of FADA focus on the harm
it could inflict on the LGBT community; 152 this was also true of a challenge to
147 See generally S. 1598 (listing thirty-seven out of fifty-four Republican Senators as co-
sponsors); H.R. 2802 (listing 171 out of 248 Republican House members as co-sponsors, as
well as one Democratic House member as a co-sponsor).
148 Mary O'Hara, First Amendment Defense Act Would be 'Devastating' for LGBTQ
Americans, NBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/first-
amendment-defense-act-would-be-devastating-lgbtq-americans-n69 84 16
[https://perma.cc/T53Y-9JAJ] (reporting on FADA including then President-elect Trump's
stated support for bill).
1'9 S. 1598, § 3(a); H.R. 2802, § 3(a). Immediately before the House held a hearing on its
bill, a representative offered an amendment to protect individuals who believe that marriage
should be recognized only between "two individuals of the opposite sex" or between "two
individuals of the same sex," apparently in an effort to minimize potential Equal Protection
Clause problems. This modified version of the bill still included the reference to non-marital
sex by also protecting beliefs that "extramarital relations are improper." AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 2802, at 3 (on file with the author).
150 S. 1598, § 3(b)(1), (3); H.R. 2802, § 3(b)(1), (3).
151 Protecting Freedom of Conscious from Government Discrimination Act, 2016 Miss.
Laws 427. At least six states considered FADAs in 2017; the precise language of these bills
varied, with some broader than the federal FADA and others narrower. See Liz Hayes, States
of Emergency: Legislation that Threatens Church-State Separation Is Pending in Half the
Country, 70 CHURCH & STATE 1, 8 (2017) (reporting that Illinois, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming considered versions of FADA).
152 See, e.g., O'Hara, supra note 148 (summarizing bill as one that would prohibit
government from taking discriminatory acts "against any business or person that
discriminates against LGBTQ people"); Matthew Rozsa, GOP's Next Battle Against Gay
Rights: Proposed First Amendment Defense Act Will Use "Religious Freedom" to Legalize
Discrimination, SALON (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/12/22/gops-next-battle-
against-gay-rights-proposed-first-amendment-defense-act-will-use-religious-freedom-to-
legalize-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/GUU5-PXXU] (summarizing bill as one that would
"turn[] back the clock on gay rights").
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the constitutionality of the Mississippi law.1 53 This myopia is troubling. While
it is clear that the legalization of same-sex marriage provided the impetus for
FADA, its drafters and supporters seek to insulate from government censure
anyone who objects to a much broader range of intimate conduct. There are
strong arguments that FADA is unconstitutional. 154 However, if enacted and
enforced-at the federal level or by individual states-FADA could have
consequences that reach far beyond the LGBT community.
In sum, recent Supreme Court decisions expanding the scope of entities that
may bring RFRA claims and the scope of the "ministerial" exception
dramatically increase the likelihood that religious organizations and for-profit
businesses will seek exemptions from otherwise applicable non-discrimination
laws. The Trump Administration has stated explicitly it will prioritize religious
liberty claims over other competing governmental objectives. Masterpiece
Cakeshop may go even further in this direction, and FADA and other proposed
bills would create explicit carve-outs and exemptions. Opponents of these
developments have rightly raised alarm about the dangers they pose to
individuals' freedom to make choices around family formation. But the often
overlooked truth is that even without these developments, these intimate liberties
are under- or unprotected by existing law.
II. REGULATION OF "STATUS" AND "CONDUCT" GENERALLY
Part III examines how private antidiscrimination law protects (or often fails
to protect) individuals' choices regarding intimate conduct by examining case
law regarding cohabiting couples denied rental apartments, same-sex couples
denied marriage-related services, and unmarried pregnant women who are fired
or subject to other adverse actions at work. In each context, courts struggle with
what often serves as an outcome-derivative distinction: whether to characterize
the situation as an example of unlawful discrimination on the basis of a protected
"status" or a permissible response to unprotected "conduct." Before looking at
the specifics of case law, however, it is helpful to sketch the parameters of how
courts assess distinctions between status and conduct more generally. This Part
offers a relatively brief summary of several complicated principles, many of
which have been underdeveloped in the literature. This is not intended to be a
comprehensive discussion of the issue; indeed, it is not even intended to be a
153 See Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 708-11 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (analyzing effect
law would have on "LGBT Mississippians" and describing it as "vehicle for state-sanctioned
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity"). The narrow focus was
clearly unwarranted because one of the named plaintiffs in the case was a woman in a long-
term unmarried heterosexual relationship. See id at 688-89.
'54 See generally First Amendment Defense Act: Hearing on H.R. 2802 Before the H
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Katherine Franke,
Professor, Columbia Law School) (arguing that FADA is unconstitutional); see also generally
Barber, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (granting preliminary injunction against Mississippi bill),
rev'd on other grounds, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing).
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definitive explication of my own views, which I hope to develop further in future
work. Rather, I simply seek to identify some generally shared understandings of
the subject and describe how the Supreme Court has approached the question in
some recent decisions.
A. Distinctions
The Constitution constrains discrimination on the basis of key personal
characteristics or statuses; laws or public actions that treat discrete classes of
persons unequally on the basis of their race, national origin, alienage, sex, or
legitimacy are carefully scrutinized, and most are disallowed.155 As Part I
discussed, modem constitutional law also protects individual choices around
intimacy, procreation, and marriage from government control. The First
Amendment likewise protects the freedom of speech, religion, and assembly.1 56
Thus, it is well established that the Constitution can constrain the government's
ability to regulate on the basis of conduct as well as status and that these issues
can overlap.
Different questions arise when one considers the regulation of status and
conduct by private actors. 157 Private actors are generally not constrained by the
Constitution, and the default assumption in American law is that they have broad
latitude to make choices regarding whom they hire, fire, rent to, and serve.
158
That said, this discretion is limited by relatively robust antidiscrimination
protections that regulate private businesses or other entities that operate in a
public or semi-public sphere.159 Employers, housing providers, and public
accommodations are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of (at least)
s15 See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 755-57 & n.61 (listing classifications that receive strict
scrutiny and observing that "[h]eightened scrutiny generally results in the invalidation of state
action").
116 U.S. CONsT. amend I.
1' Indeed, even though public employees should enjoy protections for intimate liberties
because the government is bound by the Constitution, courts have been quite deferential to
public employers' claims that community morals or workplace discomfort can justify
terminating employees. See generally, e.g., Murray, supra note 13. As Professor Murray
argues, this seems an unreasonable narrowing of the concept of liberty endorsed by Eisenstadt
and Lawrence. See Murray, supra note 13, at 593; see also Clarke, supra note 13 (making
similar point).
158 See, e.g., Pauline Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Workplace,
94 N.C. L. REv. 601, 610 (2016) (explaining that generally constitutional protections have
little direct application to private employers, except where challenged action can be attributed
to government regulation or where government is entwined in management of employer).
159 The size or reach of the business often serves as a proxy for whether or not an entity is
"public" enough to be regulated. Thus, for example, federal employment discrimination laws
typically do not apply to entities with fewer than fifteen employees, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (2012) (Title VII threshold), and the federal Fair Housing Act does not apply to
owner-occupied buildings with fewer than four units, see id. § 3603(b)(2).
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race, sex, religion, and national origin. 160 State and local laws frequently protect
against discrimination on the basis of additional characteristics-including,
most relevantly, protections against discrimination on the basis of marital status
or sexual orientation. 161
Antidiscrimination laws are described as justified because they protect
individuals against discrimination based on immutable characteristics,
expressing a consensus in modem American society that it is unfair to be
excluded from opportunities simply because of who one is. 16 2 In recent years,
courts and commentators have embraced a somewhat broader concept-
sometimes dubbed the "new immutability"-that includes not only actually
unchangeable traits, but also, in the words of one influential decision, "traits that
are so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to
penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that
change might be physically." 63 This rationale has been offered not only to
justify protections against religious discrimination, but also protections against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.16 But even as refrained, this
characterization focuses on protection for individual traits, not conduct.
By contrast, there are relatively few legislative limits on private actors'
abilities to regulate conduct of employees, renters, and customers. A handful of
states have enacted laws that limit employeis' ability to penalize employees for
lawful, out-of-work conduct.1 65 Common law provides some weak limits on
exceptional interference with the autonomy of third parties. 166 But in most
160 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (prohibiting discrimination by public accommodations on
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin); id. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting employment
discrimination on basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin); id. § 3604
(prohibiting housing discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin); Sepper, supra note 56, at 638 (stating that virtually all states prohibit public
accommodations from discriminating based on sex, even though federal law does not).
161 See Maps of State Laws and Policies, supra note 10; sources cited supra note 56.
162 See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1483, 1514 (2011) (concluding that concept of
immutability generally "provides a rationale for the protected classifications encompassed
within the antidiscrimination statutes"); see generally Jessica A. Clark, Against Immutability,
125 YALE L.J. 2 (2015) (discussing and critiquing courts' focus on immutability).
163 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1988) (Norris, J., concurring in
judgment); see generally, e.g., Clarke, supra note 162 (discussing this case law); Hoffman,
supra note 162 (discussing and generally supporting an expansive concept of immutability).
1 See generally, e.g., Watkins, 875 F.2d 699 (discussing discrimination based on sexual
orientation and what protection law should offer).
161 See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do when You Are Not at Work?: Limiting
the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 625, 646-70 (2004) (discussing several states with relatively broad prohibitions on
employers taking adverse actions against employees for off-duty lawful conduct).
' See generally, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Off-the-
Job Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 47 (1997) (discussing range of
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jurisdictions, an employer can fire an employee with impunity for engaging in
conduct it finds distasteful. 167 This can include speech or actions that would
merit protection under the First Amendment if the government engaged in
comparable actions. 168 Likewise, landlords and public accommodations
routinely put rules in place that constrain conduct. Most occasion little comment
or dissension. To most observers, a sign on the door proclaiming "no shoes, no
shirt, no service" is very different from a sign proclaiming "whites only."
A business may find a rule prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, race,
or sexual orientation just as antithetical to its preferences as a rule that limits its
discretion to respond to employees' speech or actions. And compliance with
either kind of rule might impose indirect costs on the business, in that it might
run counter to customer preferences. That said, the willingness of legislative
bodies to enact the first kind of law-i.e., antidiscrimination laws-and the
general reluctance to enact the second kind of law-i.e., regulations on
responses to conduct-likely reflects two corollary assumptions. First, that the
arguments made by private entities to justify excluding individuals solely on the
basis of statuses like race or sex are generally considered less compelling or
acceptable than the arguments made by private entities to justify regulating the
conduct of employees, renters, or customers. 169 And, second, that the harm
experienced by third parties who are excluded on the basis of their status is
considered more significant than the harm caused by exclusion on the basis of
their conduct. This second proposition gains even more salience from the
assumption that status is immutable, whereas conduct is within one's control.
B. Connections
The generalizations in Section II.A assume that a valid distinction can be
made between "status" and "conduct." Often, that is clearly correct. But in some
instances, the line between status and conduct may be difficult to draw or wholly
illusory. For example, the conduct at issue may be closely related to, or practiced
common law and statutory provisions that can protect associational privacy). The recent
Restatement ofEmployment Law identifies a more general right of employee "autonomy," but
states that employers can act on a "reasonable and good-faith belief that the employee's
exercise of an autonomy interest interfered with the employer's legitimate business interests,
including its orderly operations and reputation in the marketplace." RESTATEMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.08(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). Even if courts adopted the concept of
employee autonomy, this exception is so large that it could easily swallow up the rule.
16' See generally, e.g., Pagnattaro, supra note 165 (discussing various scenarios in which
employer may fire employee for conduct of which employer disapproves).
168 See generally Kim, supra note 158.
169 An exception to this general rule is status-based discrimination that is premised on
religious belief; as described supra Section I.C, religious actors may be excused from
compliance with antidiscrimination laws because the justification for such discrimination is
deemed compelling or because enforcement of the laws would implicate constitutionally
protected religious freedoms.
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primarily by, a particular group. The Supreme Court provided a pithy example
of this point, observing that "[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews." 170
In such cases, enforcement of a conduct-based regulation will tend to
disproportionately, or uniformly, regulate members of a particular group. This
may be unintentional, or the conduct-based regulation may have been adopted
purposefully as a method of disadvantaging the group, where explicit status-
based discrimination would be unquestionably illegal. In such cases, conduct-
based bans function as status exclusions. A second, distinct way in which the
line between status and conduct may be illusory is when the "status" that is
protected is itself defined by conduct.
In constitutional contexts where the line between status and conduct blurs, the
Court has comfortably announced a "synergy" between various clauses, such as
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, so that a holding under one
simultaneously advances the other. 171 Thus, although equal protection claims
foreground the harm that comes from unfair exclusion based on (protected)
status, and due process claims foreground the harm that comes from unfair
exclusion based on (protected) conduct, the overlap between the two concepts is
evident. Indeed, commentators have observed that in constitutional analysis, the
Supreme Court has moved away from traditional antidiscrimination
jurisprudence, rooted in the Equal Protection Clause, towards a more universal
approach that emphasizes protecting individual autonomy and dignity, grounded
in the Due Process Clause. 172 Professor Kenji Yoshino memorably described this
transition as similar to "squeezing a balloon," so that the "contents do not escape,
but erupt" in another area of law. 73
But in interpreting the statutory provisions that govern private actions related
to discrimination, courts typically try to enforce more rigid distinctions between
the "status" and "conduct." For example, courts usually reject challenges to
employer grooming codes that proscribe hairstyles, such as dreadlocks,
associated with certain racial and ethnic groups, pointing to the
immutable/mutable distinction and concluding that because it is possible for
racial minorities to comply with the rule, it is not the same as a status-based
exclusion.17 4 Courts have similarly rejected claims that English-only policies
170 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
171 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (describing "synergy" between
two protections).
172 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 3, at 802 (arguing that Supreme Court has shifted from
its traditional equal protection jurisprudence toward liberty-based dignity jurisprudence,"
which "synthesizes both equality and liberty claims, but leads with the latter"); see also Leslie
Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 169, 169 (2011) ("[T]he
Court's reliance on dignity is increasing, and the Roberts Court is accelerating that trend.").
171 Yoshino, supra note 3, at 748.
174 See, e.g., EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016)
(concluding that because "Title VII protects persons in covered categories with respect to
their immutable characteristics, but not their cultural practices[]" requiring prospective
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intentionally discriminate on the basis of national origin, at least where they are
applied to employees who can speak English. 75 Even under disparate impact
doctrine-which seems like it should be an effective vehicle for challenging
rules regarding conduct that unevenly affect racial or ethnic minorities-courts
sometimes point to the "voluntariness" of the relevant actions as a justification
for denying the claim. 176 Additionally, courts often require plaintiffs bringing
disparate impact claims to provide extensive statistical analysis at the level of
the individual workplace, which can be expensive to produce.177
In some other contexts, however, courts-or Congress in response to unduly
cramped decisions by courts-have signaled greater willingness to reject
employers' claims that challenged practices were permissible regulation of
conduct. For example, in the 1970s, employers argued that pregnancy
discrimination did not constitute sex discrimination, in part on the ground that
the pregnancy was the result of (generally voluntary) conduct.17 8 Congress
disagreed, passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.179 The line of cases
beginning with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkinss0 recognizes that failure to
conform to sex stereotypes is a cognizable claim; such cases often incorporate
employee to cut off dreadlocks did not violate statute). But see generally Camille Gear Rich,
Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII,
79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1134 (2004) (arguing that Title VII should be interpreted more broadly to
also protect against discrimination based on "performed" behaviors that communicate racial
or ethnic identities).
175 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding English-only
policy applied to individuals who could speak English did not violate Title VII). But see
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial to rehear case en banc)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that English-only policies constituted national origin
discrimination because they "not only symbolize a rejection of the excluded language and the
culture it embodies, but also a denial of that side of an individual's personality").
176 See, e.g., Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1029-30 (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618
F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)) ("[T]here is no disparate impact if the rule is one that the
affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual
preference .... ).
177 I have discussed these issues in the context of disparate impact challenges to criminal
background checks. See Deborah A. Widiss, Griggs at Midlfe, 113 MICH. L. REv. 993, 1014-
15(2015).
17' The focus on voluntariness was partly due to the fact that early cases challenged the
exclusion of pregnancy from otherwise comprehensive disability policies. See, e.g., Gilbert v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 375, 381-82 (E.D. Va. 1974) (discussing company's claims
that pregnancy should not be covered because it was "voluntary"), rev'd on other grounds,
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
171 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)) (stating that discrimination on basis of sex includes
discrimination on basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions).
1so 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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consideration of "conduct" explicitly. 81 Cases recognizing that discriminating
against an individual because he or she is in an interracial relationship violates
Title VII's prohibition on race discrimination likewise blur the line between
"status" and "conduct." 82 More recently, the reasoning from both of these lines
of cases has been applied by some courts to hold that discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.183 This is not a
comprehensive survey; however, it is perhaps noteworthy that many of the
contexts in which courts have interpreted antidiscrimination laws to reach at
least some conduct concern intimate choices that are accorded special protection
under the Constitution.
C. A Case Study: Gay Rights
The difficulty of drawing a line between "status" and "conduct" has been
discussed particularly fully in the gay rights context and-crucially important
for my argument-in this context courts have comfortably imported
constitutional doctrine regarding the blurring of status and conduct into analysis
of private antidiscrimination law. Section III.B discusses this in detail. But
before diving into that case law, it is helpful to sketch out the path that led to
Lawrence and then to the later Christian Legal Society v. Martinez'" decision
that has been particularly important in that analysis. This review suggests that
the Court's explicit rejection of the distinction between status and conduct in
this context is likely, in part at least, an accident of history. It reflects strategic
choices made by gay rights litigators in response to constitutional decisions that
expanded and contracted the understanding of the scope of the personal liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.185
181 See, e.g., id. at 250 (concluding that "employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender" and
thus violated Title VII).
182 See Victoria Schwartz, Title VI: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 209, 213-34 (2012); see also, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
575 (1983) (approving IRS determination that ban on interracial dating constituted racial
discrimination, and finding no First Amendment violation in denying religious school's tax
exempt status because of policy).
183 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346-49 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (relying on Hopkins and other cases concerning sex stereotyping and cases concerning
interracial couples to hold that discrimination on basis of sexual orientation is prohibited).
184 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
185 Much of this history is drawn from Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1579 (1993) (characterizing gay and lesbian
litigation in early 1990s as "dominate[d]" by "conduct/status distinction"). See generally, e.g.,
Janet E. Halley, The Status/Conduct Distinction in the 1993 Revisions to the Military Anti-
Gay Policy: A Legal Archaeology, 3 GLQ 159 (1996) (discussing how military's "don't ask,
don't tell" policy grew out of earlier advocacy premised on distinctions between status and
conduct).
2 115
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
When Griswold announced constitutional protections for private decisions
about sexual intimacy, gay rights activists understood that comparable
arguments could be deployed to challenge anti-sodomy laws and other laws that
criminalized forms of sexual intimacy typically practiced by same-sex couples.
However, the claims met with mixed results during the 1970s.186 The 1986
decision Bowers v. Hardwick,187 which held that there was "no fundamental
right" for homosexuals to "engage in sodomy," seemed to foreclose a due-
process-based focus on the liberty interests at stake.188
Both before and after Bowers, some advocates simultaneously pushed for a
sharp demarcation between status and conduct and advanced claims under the
Equal Protection Clause. 18 9 They argued that discriminating against individuals
because of their "status" as homosexuals-e.g., denying them public
employment-violated equal protection principals, even if homosexual intimacy
could be criminalized. 190 This was sometimes successful, particularly where
there was no evidence of prohibited conduct. 191 The benefits of this approach
are clear, in that it provided much-needed protection to individuals against job
loss or other collateral consequences of being labeled "gay." But a legal strategy
that was premised on remaining in the closet, or foregoing any kind of sexual
intimacy at all, obviously imposed real and significant harms as well. 192
In Lawrence, the petitioners took on Bowers more directly. 193 The Court's
decision reversed Bowers and affirmed the constitutionally protected right to
make individual choices around sexual intimacy, including sexual intimacy with
persons of the same-sex.1 94 This decision, which, as discussed above, rested on
both due process and equal protection grounds, effectively ended the litigation-
driven need to pretend that "status" and "conduct" could be divided in this
context. But Lawrence went further in explicating the way in which the concepts
are interrelated, observing correctly that criminalization of the conduct "in and
186 See Cain, supra note 185, at 1589-91.
187 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
188 Id. at 186.
189 See Cain, supra note 185, at 1598, 1617-27 (describing cases and academic
commentary that attempted to bifurcate conflation of status and conduct and related conflation
of due process and equal protection claims).
190 See id. at 1572-79.
191 See id at 1572-79, 1595-1608. A few courts went further and held that even where
conduct was admitted, it could not be the basis of adverse actions if there was not a reasonable
nexus between the conduct and the asserted government interest. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy,
417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that "unparticularized and unsubstantiated
conclusion that such possible embarrassment threatens the quality of the agency's
performance is an arbitrary ground for dismissal").
192 The military's now-roundly repudiated "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy was an extreme
example of this. See generally Halley, supra note 185.
193 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
194 Id. at 577-78 (explicitly overruling Bowers).
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of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in
the public and in the private spheres." 95 In other words, criminal prohibitions
on "conduct" cause discrimination on the basis of "status." Justice O'Connor's
concurrence made a similar point, concluding that because the conduct "is
closely correlated with being homosexual," the law is targeted at "more than
conduct," but also at "gay persons as a class."1 96
This confluence was further developed in Christian Legal Society. The issue
in Christian Legal Society was whether Hastings Law School could refuse to
recognize student groups that did not open their membership to all students. 197
The applicable policy specifically precluded discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, as well as religion. 198 The Christian Legal Society ("CLS")
required members to sign a "Statement of Faith," which included a tenet that
CLS interpreted to exclude anyone who engaged in "unrepentant homosexual
conduct." 99 Hastings refused to recognize CLS as a "registered student
organization" and CLS sued, claiming that the denial violated its rights under
the First Amendment. CLS argued that the group did not exclude individuals on
the basis of their sexual orientation (which they admitted would violate the
school's nondiscrimination policy), but rather only excluded those who had
engaged in the proscribed conduct and did so "unrepentantly." 200
The majority decision, authored by Justice Ginsburg, roundly rejected this
proposition. The Court made a blanket statement that its "decisions have
declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context." 201 This
assertion was supported with citations to portions of the majority opinion and
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas,202 the example in Bray
concluding that a "tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews," 203 and an amicus
Id. at 575.
6 Id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
197 Id. at 668.
19 Id. at 670.
199 Id. at 672. The provision was actually a more general statement that "sexual activity
should not occur outside of a marriage between a man and a woman," meaning it would
preclude membership by individuals who engaged in any form of non-marital sex. Id.
200 See Brief for Petitioner at 35-36, Christian Legal Soc'y, 561 U.S. at 661 (No. 08-1371)
("[T]he CLS Statement of Faith excludes [homosexual individuals] on the basis of a
conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong.").
201 Christian Legal Soc'y, 561 U.S. at 689.
202 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)) ("When homosexual
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination."); Lawrence, 539 at 583
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("While it is true that the law applies only to conduct,
the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual.
Under such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed
toward gay persons as a class.").
203 Christian Legal Soc'y, 561 U.S. at 689 (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993)).
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brief submitted by the gay rights group Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund.204 Notably, the referenced pages in the Lambda brief highlighted not only
the relevant portions of earlier gay rights cases, but also cases concerning
adverse actions against individuals based on interracial affiliations, religious
practices, pregnancy, failure to conform to sex-stereotypes, and membership or
association with groups associated with specific national origins.205 In other
words, Christian Legal Society implicitly supports not only the contention that
it is untenable to draw a line between status and conduct in the context of sexual
orientation, but a more general proposition that "where certain conduct is closely
correlated with status, the law often treats discrimination based on conduct as
tantamount to discrimination based on status." 206 As discussed in the next Part,
that blurring occurs not only in gay rights cases, but in other cases concerning
discrimination on the basis of intimate liberties.
III. INTIMATE LIBERTY DISCRIMINATION
This Part explores three contexts of private discrimination against individuals
for exercising their intimate liberties: landlords that refuse to rent to unmarried
couples, businesses that refuse to provide wedding- or marriage-related services
to same-sex couples, and employers that fire or otherwise discriminate against
employees who are pregnant and unmarried.207 Each of these contexts makes
private intimate choices "visible" to the external world. Nonetheless, corporate
204 Id. (citing Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7-20, Christian Legal Soc'y, 561 U.S. at 661 (No. 08-
1371))
205 Id. (citing Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 204, at 7-
20.
206 Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 204, at 13 n.5.
207 There are, of course, many other scenarios that may lead to adverse actions against an
individual for exercising intimate liberties. For example, anti-nepotism policies, under which
marriage to a co-worker can become grounds for termination, have likewise been challenged
as illegal marital status discrimination. See Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 816 P.2d 302, 303
(Haw. 1991) (collecting case law showing split among states as to whether such claims are
cognizable); Porter, supra note 13, at 38-44 (discussing and critiquing anti-nepotism policies).
These policies raise some similar concerns to the issues discussed in the text, but they might
be more legitimately justified on the basis of true business interests, such as internal conflicts
of interest that can arise. See, e.g., Muller v. BP Expl. (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 792 (Alaska
1996) (distinguishing between state's interest in protecting "person's right to choose the form
that his or her relationships will take," which justifies prohibiting discrimination against
unmarried couples, and interests addressed by anti-nepotism policies). There are also many
cases in which employees allege they were fired for engaging in non-marital affairs. See
generally Clarke, supra note 13 (collecting cases regarding discrimination based on adultery).
Again, this raises similar issues to those of the employees who are fired for engaging in non-
marital sex, but courts have been less clear that adultery is constitutionally protected, even
after Lawrence. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ADULTERY 67-72 (2016) (discussing failed
constitutional challenges to adultery regulation).
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defendants routinely argue that their actions are a permissible response to
individuals' conduct (disapproved forms of sexual intimacy or family formation)
rather than discrimination on the basis of individuals' statuses that may be
addressed in antidiscrimination law (marital status, sexual orientation, or
pregnancy). 208 This Part discusses and critiques this case law.
A. Cohabitation
As sexual mores around cohabitation and non-marital intimacy changed,
increasing numbers of (mostly different-sex) unmarried couples sought to rent
apartments or houses. During the 1980s and 1990s, there were numerous
lawsuits brought across the country by couples who were refused tenancy by
landlords who disapproved of their choice to live together without being
married. Although most of these landlords were individuals or small businesses
operating in the private marketplace, many cited religious beliefs as motivating
their refusal to rent to unmarried couples. 209 Thus, these precedents are being
invoked in the controversies unfolding today: first, as to whether discrimination
against persons for their choices around sexual intimacy violates
antidiscrimination law, and second, whether RFRA or constitutional protections
for freedom of religion nonetheless excuse religious objectors from compliance.
A handful of articles discussed some of these cases in detail at the time they
were decided. 210 Recent commentary, however, has been quite limited, beyond
a generalized assertion that there is little protection for unmarried couples who
face discrimination. 211 There has been almost no consideration of how the
208 Although these cases advance under distinct provisions of antidiscrimination law (i.e.,
housing, public accommodations, and employment), courts typically interpret
antidiscrimination mandates relatively consistently across statutes. It is possible that in
interpreting claims for religious exemptions, the extent to which application of an
antidiscrimination statute is "narrowly tailored" to advance a "compelling interest" might
differ according to the context.
209 See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996)
("Respondent believes that God will judge her if she permits people to engage in sex outside
of marriage in her rental units and that if she does so, she will be prevented from meeting her
deceased husband in the hereafter."); Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234-35 (Mass.
1994) (stating that landlord did not want to facilitate "sinful" conduct).
210 See, e.g., Michael V. Hernandez, The Right of Religious Landlords to Exclude
Unmarried Cohabitants: Debunking the Myth of the Tenant's "New Clothes," 77 NEB. L.
REv. 494, 506-10 (1998) (discussing cases in which landlords discriminated against their
tenants based on unmarried cohabitation and/or intimacy); see generally, e.g., Rebecca A.
Wistner, Note, Cohabitation, Fornication and the Free Exercise of Religion: Landlords
Seeking Religious Exemption from Fair Housing Laws, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1071 (1996)
(examining then-recent cases regarding free exercise exemptions from fair housing statutes).
211 The more comprehensive recent article is Joslin, supra note 13. This article does an
excellent job of showing why more robust protections would serve the public interest and how
changing demographics have made them increasingly important, but it only briefly discusses
the cases themselves. See id. at 808-14 (analyzing relevant cases only in passing and focusing
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dramatic changes in the constitutional landscape-which make clear that non-
marital intimacy implicates fundamental rights-should affect the interpretation
of these statutory provisions.2 12
I also seek to correct a misperception suggested by recent commentary that
the vast majority of states with such statutes have held that they do not protect
cohabiting couples.213 As these sources explain, only a few states have
definitively ruled that discrimination against cohabiting couples is prohibited by
laws that bar marital status discrimination.2 14 This is correct, but this summation
fails to emphasize that only slightly more state supreme courts have ruled the
other way.215 In other states that have relevant statutory provisions on the books,
in more detail on legislative materials). Two other recent discussions of these statutory
provisions, which focus on their application to employment, make strong normative
arguments for more robust protections, but they also include relatively little analysis of the
cases themselves. See Clarke, supra note 13, at 31-33; Porter, supra note 13, at 17-22.
212 Professor Joslin mentions this point in passing. See Joslin, supra note 13, at 815 (briefly
noting that it "seems odd" that, even after Lawrence, employers can penalize employees for
engaging in constitutionally-protected intimate conduct).
213 See id. at 809 (concluding that "in most of these twenty-one states [with marital status
discrimination provisions], it is not illegal to discriminate against a person because he or she
is a member of an unmarried cohabiting couple"); see also Clarke, supra note 13, at 32
(quoting Joslin's conclusion on this point). Similar claims are also common on the internet.
See, e.g., Frederick Hertz, Housing Discrimination Against Unmarried Couples, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/living-together-book/chapter5- 2 .html
[https://perma.cc/TS5K-BZSS] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) ("While some 20 states ban
discrimination on the basis of marital status, most of these states' laws extend protection to
married couples only. . . .").
214 These states are Alaska, California, Massachusetts, and Michigan. See Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276 (Alaska 1994); Smith v. Fair Emp't &
Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 929-31 (Cal. 1996); Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233,
235 (Mass. 1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729, partially vacated on other
grounds, 593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999). A later Michigan case, which held that an employer
could refuse to renew the contract of an employee who had engaged in adultery and then
cohabited with his mistress, may have retreated from the court's holding in McCready, in that
it emphasized that McCready did not create a "right to cohabit" and that disapproval of such
conduct did not state an antidiscrimination claim. See Veenstra v. Washtenaw Country Club,
645 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Mich. 2002). However, the Veenstra court did not overrule McCready.
In a case where the only conduct at issue is cohabitation of unmarried individuals (as opposed
to Veenstra, where the employee had committed adultery), and where a landlord (or employer)
would not have disapproved of the conduct if the couple who cohabited were married, it seems
as though marital status is part of the basis for decision and thus actionable.
215 These states are Maryland, Minnesota, North Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. See
Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, 475 A.2d 1192, 1198 (Md. 1984); Cooper
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 7 (Minn. 1990); N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001
ND 81, ¶ 37, 625 N.W.2d 551, 562; Waggoner v. Ace Hardware Corp., 953 P.2d 88, 89-92
(Wash. 1998) (holding in employment discrimination case that state's marital discrimination
law does not protect cohabiting couples and using reasoning that would likely apply in
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my research suggests there simply is no authoritative interpretation.
Recognizing that the numbers are relatively equal is important because it argues
against claims that the interpretation of these statutes is "well settled."
That said, it is true that several state supreme courts have concluded that the
statutes do not protect cohabiting couples. Ultimately, I argue that these
precedents should be reconsidered because they rely on criminal prohibitions on
non-marital sex that are unconstitutional after Lawrence.216 This would directly
benefit unmarried couples, heterosexual and homosexual alike, who may still
face discrimination when they try to rent apartments or homes. 217 It would also
help ensure that the unduly constrained interpretations that characterized much
of this first wave of litigation are not exported into the cases emerging today
concerming same-sex marriage and unmarried pregnancy.
1. Discrimination
In many states, unmarried couples who face discrimination have no legal
recourse. The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin, religion, sex, disability, and the presence of children,
but it does not explicitly address marital status.218 Thus, cohabiting couples who
housing context); Cty. of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 714 (Wis. 1993). Connecticut's
statute specifically defines marital status not to cover such situations. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46a-64-c(b)(1) (2016) (stating provision "shall not be construed to prohibit the denial of a
dwelling to a man or a woman who are both unrelated by blood and not married to each
other"). Oregon's statutory provision also may not apply in at least some such situations, in
that the statute specifies that the section does not apply if it would "necessarily result in
common use of bath or bedroom facilities by unrelated persons of opposite sex"; however,
the specific reference in this section is to sex discrimination, not marital status discrimination,
and the configuration of the housing involved might also affect the applicability of this
section. See OR. REv. STAT. § 659A.421(6) (2017).
216 Cf Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding older
decision interpreting statute not to reach cohabiting couples should be reconsidered because
it relied on anti-fornication laws that had since been repealed). The Illinois Supreme Court
later denied a petition for leave to appeal from this decision but also vacated the judgment,
leaving Illinois law on the point unsettled. Jasniowski v. Rushing, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997)
(mem.).
217 Living together without being married has become quite common, but since one-third
of Americans still disapprove of non-marital cohabitation, see supra note 105 and
accompanying text, it is almost certain that such discrimination persists, see, e.g., Fair
Housing Center Settles Case Addressing over 30 Years ofAlleged Housing Discrimination,
GRAND RAPiDs TIMEs (Mar. 18, 2011) http://www.grtimes.com/archive20ll/3_18_201 .asp
[https://perma.cc/S2FU-UJ9L] (describing Michigan fair housing agency's use of "testers" to
establish that owners of condominium complex routinely refused to rent to unmarried
couples).
218 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012). The statute includes a prohibition
on discrimination on the basis of "familial status" but this is defined as the presence or absence
of children, id. § 3602(k), and thus does not protect unmarried couples who might face
discrimination.
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face discrimination have no claim under federal law. About half of the states
also do not address marital status in their housing antidiscrimination laws.2 19
Accordingly, in these jurisdictions (absent applicable local law), such
discrimination is likely lawful.
The other half of states, however, do explicitly prohibit discrimination on the
basis of marital status. 220 This language was typically added to state codes during
the 1970s and 1980s. 2 2 1 Several state supreme courts have concluded that these
statutes preclude discrimination against cohabiting couples. As framed by these
courts, the interpretation is straightforward. A landlord who would willingly rent
to a couple who is married but refuses to rent to the same couple if they are not
married has made a distinction on the basis of "marital status." 222 Thus, for
example, the Alaska Supreme Court explained: "The [landlord] would have
rented the apartment to Hohman, Kiefer and [their infant baby] had Hohman and
Kiefer been married; the [landlord] refused to rent the apartment only after they
learned that Hohman and Kiefer were not married. This constitutes unlawful
discrimination based on marital status." 223 To the extent there is any ambiguity,
219 See sources cited supra note 56.
220 Id.
221 Joslin, supra note 13, at 806. Courtney G. Joslin, Discrimination in and out of
Marriage, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming January 2018), offers a detailed (and fascinating)
history of a provision in federal law that prohibits marital status discrimination in access to
credit, showing that this provision was spurred primarily by concerns about discrimination
against married women. The article does not, however, discuss what concerns may have
motivated adding marital status provisions to state housing discrimination protections.
Notably, in the credit context, there is no reason to assume that there would ever be
discrimination against cohabiting couples (or even that companies would know that
individuals were cohabiting). In the housing context, by contrast, discrimination against
cohabiting couples was common at the time. Moreover, as Joslin notes, even if cohabiting
couples were not a primary intended beneficiary of the marital status provisions, the plain
language of the statute readily applies to this context. See generally id.; cf Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 ("[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.").
222 See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 915 (Cal. 1996) ("The
statutory language banning discrimination based on 'marital status' naturally carries both
meanings [married and unmarried]."); Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Mass. Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 547 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989) (characterizing statute's term "marital status"
as "reasonably straightforward").
223 Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Alaska 1989); see
also, e.g., McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Mich. 1998) (observing "sole factor
that defendants employed in determining that plaintiffs were unworthy of renting their
available apartments was plaintiffs' marital status"), partially vacated on other grounds, 593
N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999).
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it tilts in favor of coverage under a general principle of statutory interpretation
that remedial statutes are to be interpreted broadly.224
These courts deemed the plain meaning controlling, notwithstanding anti-
fornication provisions that existed when the marital status provisions were added
to the antidiscrimination statutes. In Alaska, the criminal prohibition on non-
marital sex had been repealed prior to the state supreme court's decisions on the
cohabitation question.225 The landlord in the case, nonetheless, argued that the
statutes should be interpreted restrictively so as not cover conduct that was
technically illegal when it was enacted. 226 The court rejected these arguments,
explaining it would be "manifestly unreasonable to limit the effect of these
modem remedial provisions [prohibiting marital status discrimination] by
reference to an outdated criminal statute that had been [subsequently]
repealed." 227 In Michigan, the state's anti-fornication statute remained on the
books when the court interpreted its marital status provision.228 The Michigan
Supreme Court nonetheless followed the plain meaning of the antidiscrimination
statute, noting that the criminal prohibition on cohabitation had not been used
successfully to prosecute unmarried couples for nearly sixty years (and further
that it was not clear that the couple intended to engage in the "lewd and
lascivious" conduct that was criminalized).229
Courts that have held the opposite-that is, that discrimination against
cohabiting couples is not covered by bans on marital status discrimination-
typically rely on the putative need to reconcile the prohibition on marital status
discrimination with anti-fornication or anti-cohabitation provisions or the state's
more generalized public policy in support of marriage. The North Dakota
Supreme Court, for example, began its statutory analysis with the criminal
prohibition on cohabitation, emphasizing that the state has prohibited "unlawful
cohabitation" since statehood, 230 and that the legislature had not discussed the
224 See, e.g., McCready, 586 N.W.2d at 724 ("Being that the act is remedial, we construe
it liberally.").
225 See Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1202 (stating that legislature repealed its anti-fornication law
in 1978).
226 See id. The landlord made similar arguments in the California case, but they got even
less traction because California had repealed its law criminalizing private sexual conduct
between consenting adults a few months prior to prohibiting marital status discrimination in
its housing law. See Smith, 913 P.2d at 918.
227 Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1202; see Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997) (concluding that earlier Illinois appellate decision, Mister v. A.R.K P'ship, 553
N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), was not controlling because Illinois had subsequently
decriminalized cohabitation). Jasniowski, however, was later vacated by the Illinois Supreme
Court leaving the status of this interpretation unclear. Jasniowski v. Rushing, 685 N.E.2d 622
(Ill. 1997) (mem.).
228 McCready, 586 N.W.2d at 730.
229 Id. at 726-28.
230 N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, TT 10-12, 625 N.W.2d 551,
555-56.
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cohabitation statute when it enacted the prohibition on marital status
discrimination as part of a more general human rights act in 1983.231 It concluded
that because repeals by implication are disfavored, the marital status provisions
cannot be read to sanction conduct that would be prohibited by the cohabitation
statute. 232 The Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning was similar; it focused on
the need to harmonize the marital status provision with the anti-fornication
statute and thereby protect the "institutions which have sustained our
civilization, namely marriage and family life." 2 33 Rather shockingly, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to enforce a local ordinance, which prohibited
marital status discrimination and even explicitly defined marital status as
including cohabitation, by suggesting the local ordinance was inconsistent with
the general perambulatory language in the state's family law code encouraging
marriage. 234
Courts support these strained interpretations by distinguishing between what
they call "status" based protections-that is, the status of being "married" or
"single"-and allegedly improper conduct. For example, the North Dakota
Supreme Court claimed that "the cohabitation statute and the discriminatory
housing provision are harmonized by recognizing that the cohabitation statute
regulates conduct, not status." 235 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned
similarly that "[1]iving together is 'conduct,' not 'status'." 236 Thus, under this
interpretation, the statutes protect against a categorical exclusion of all married
couples, or all single individuals, but they do not prohibit discrimination based
on a couple's choice to live together. However, this putative distinction breaks
down under scrutiny. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed in
reaching the opposite conclusion, it is precisely the fact that the couple is
unmarried but living together that is the basis for the objection; thus, it should
be recognized as illegal marital status discrimination. 237
231 Id. at 13, 625 N.W.2d at 556.
232 Id. at ¶ 37, 625 N.W.2d at 562. ("The cohabitation statute and the discriminatory
housing provision are harmonized by recognizing that the cohabitation statute regulates
conduct, not status. The opposite interpretation would render the prohibition against
cohabitation meaningless.").
233 Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5-6, 8 (Minn. 1990).
234 Cty. of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Wis. 1993) (invalidating defendant
county's statute because it infringed "spirit" or "policy" of state legislation). Wisconsin had
repealed its criminal prohibition on fornication in 1983. See BOWMAN, supra note 25, at 16.
235 Peterson, 2001 ND 81, ¶ 37, 625 N.W.2d at 562.
236 Norman, 497 N.W.2d at 718.
237 See Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994) ("The controlling and
discriminating difference between [a married couple who would be able to rent the apartment
and an unmarried couple who is denied it] is the difference in the marital status of the two
couples."); see also Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 n.4
(Alaska 1994) (stating that landlord "cannot reasonably claim that he does not rent or show
property to cohabiting couples based on their conduct (living together outside of marriage)
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The robust constitutional protection afforded by Lawrence provides further
support for rejecting any kind of claimed distinction between "status" and
"conduct" in this context. As discussed above, anti-fornication and anti-
cohabitation statutes almost certainly can no longer be constitutionally enforced.
Indeed, even back in 1972, when the Supreme Court decided Eisenstadt, the case
guaranteeing unmarried individuals access to contraceptives, the Court treated
Massachusetts's anti-fornication statute as relatively unimportant (in Susan
Appleton's words, merely a "data point"238), emphasizing that the punishment
for use of contraception was so disproportionate to the punishment for
fornication that it could not be justified as a reasonable means of enforcing the
State's interest.239 It should be all the more apparent now that these remnants of
the defunct marriage-crime binary should not be invoked to undermine the plain
language of antidiscrimination protections. It is well established that courts may
properly revisit statutory interpretation precedents to respond to intervening
developments in the law.240 Indeed, as the California Supreme Court observed
in holding that cohabiting couples were protected by a marital status provision,
the contrary interpretation could itself raise constitutional problems in that it
would be treating couples unfavorably based on their exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.24 1
2. Religious Objectors
In the states that held protections on the basis of marital status do apply to
cohabiting couples, courts went on to determine whether, despite the statute's
general applicability, religious objectors could be excused from compliance
under federal or state constitutional provisions or state RFRAs. In some states,
the courts held that landlords had to comply with the antidiscrimination
provisions as part of the deal they accepted when they chose to participate in the
and not their marital status when their marital status (unmarried) is what makes their conduct
immoral in his opinion").
238 Appleton, supra note 43, at 17.
239 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1972) ("We, like the Court of Appeals,
cannot believe that in this instance Massachusetts has chosen to expose the aider and abetter
who simply gives away a contraceptive to 20 times the 90-day sentence of the offender
himself.").
240 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1989) (indicating that
where intervening developments "have removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings
from the primary decision, or where the law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with
competing legal doctrines or policies," it may appropriately be overruled); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1479 (1987)
(arguing that statutes should be "interpreted 'dynamically,' that is, in light of present societal,
political, and legal context").
241 Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 917 n.10 (Cal. 1996). This claim
is particularly strong in California, as the California Constitution includes an explicit right to
privacy.
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for-profit housing market.242 For example, the California Supreme Court
suggested that a landlord who was uncomfortable renting to unmarried couples
could always sell the units and redeploy the capital in other investments, but that
accommodating the landlord would have a "serious impact" on the public's
"legal and dignity interests in freedom from discrimination based on personal
characteristics." 243 The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned similarly in a case
concerning the application of the prohibition on marital status discrimination in
employment.244 The court explained that, "by engaging in this secular endeavor,
[the owners of a chain of health clubs] have passed over the line that affords
them absolute freedom to exercise religious beliefs," and that the state's
"overriding compelling interest" in eliminating discrimination could be
"substantially frustrated" if employers professing religious beliefs could
discriminate on the prohibited grounds.245
But in a few of these early housing decisions, courts suggested that even in
states that explicitly prohibited discrimination on the basis of marital status, that
interest was not weighty enough to require compliance when weighed against
religious liberty claims brought by landlords. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court provided the fullest discussion of the issue. Although the court
ultimately held that the constitutional issue could not be decided on summary
judgment, it expressed significant skepticism that the State's interest in
eradicating discrimination on the basis of marital status was "compelling." 246
Rather, it opined that "marital status discrimination is not as intense a State
concern as is discrimination based on certain other classifications [such as race
or sex] . . . because there is no constitutionally-based prohibition against
242 See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Ala. 1994)
(noting that landlord had not made showing that his religion required him to engage in
property rental business and that "[v]oluntary commercial activity does not receive same
status accorded to directly religious activity"); Smith, 913 P.2d at 925 (noting that landlord
could sell her property if she no longer wished to participate in market); McClure v. Sports &
Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985) (noting that by trafficking in commercial
market, defendants had made themselves subject to regulations). The Michigan Supreme
Court initially held that the landlord's religious freedom rights were not violated in McCready
v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 728-29 (Mich. 1998) (finding "[t]he law is generally applicable
because it prohibits all discrimination and has no religious motivation"), but subsequently
vacated this aspect of the decision and remanded it to the lower court for further analysis in
McCready v. Hoffius, 593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999).
243 Smith, 913 P.2d at 925; see also Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283 ("The 'Hobson's choice,' of
which the [landlord] complains, is caused by his choice to enter into a commercial activity
that is regulated by anti-discrimination laws.").
244 McClure, 370 N.W.2d at 853. As discussed above, a later decision by the Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted the prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of marital status in
housing more narrowly, holding that it did not protect cohabiting couples. See Cooper v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5-6, 8 (Minn. 1990).
245 McClure, 370 N.W.2d at 853.
246 Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Mass. 1994).
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discriminating on the basis of marital status." 247 Three judges filed a dissent that
went even further, arguing that the court should have granted summary judgment
on behalf of the objecting landlords; they reasoned that because the "right to free
exercise of religion is a fundamental right," the State's interest in
"accommodating cohabitation cannot possibly outweigh the defendants'
interest." 248 Justice Thomas expressed similar themes in a dissent from the
Supreme Court's refusal to hear an appeal from the Alaska Supreme Court's
decision, 249 as did a panel of the Ninth Circuit in a subsequent federal
constitutional challenge to Alaska's law 25 0 (although the panel decision was
subsequently vacated by the full circuit).251
These precedents have been invoked in current controversies concerning
businesses that refuse to serve same-sex couples or refuse to provide access to
reproductive health care. For example, as discussed in the next Part, the Supreme
Court will soon decide whether the Masterpiece Cakeshop's freedoms of speech
and religion were unconstitutionally abridged when it was fined for refusing to
bake a wedding cake for a gay couple. The petitioners' brief in the case cites to
the Massachusetts housing case to argue that the state law does not serve a
compelling interest, at least as applied to the bakery. 252 The Massachusetts
decision was cited for the same proposition in briefs submitted to the
Washington Supreme Court in a case concerning a florist who refused to serve
a gay couple. 253 A federal district court considering a challenge to the Affordable
247 Id. at 238-39.
248 Id. at 247 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
249 Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 981 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (expressing high levels of
skepticism that preventing discrimination on basis of marital status could satisfy "compelling
interest" test under RFRA, in part on ground that marital status classifications are not afforded
heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause).
250 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 715 (9th Cir. 1999)
(asserting "firm national policy" against race discrimination but "it is beyond cavil that there
is no similar 'firm national policy' against marital-status discrimination" and that it is
"eminently sensible to look to equal protection precedent as a proxy for the importance that
attaches to the eradication of particular forms of discrimination").
251 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that action was not ripe for judicial review, as landlords had not yet suffered hardship
under policy); see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 102 P.2d 937, 946-947
(Alaska 2004) (reaffirming Alaska Supreme Court's earlier decision that enforcement of
antidiscrimination mandate did not violate landlords' religious liberty).
252 Brief for Petitioners at 21, Masterpiece Cake Shop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n,
137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111).
253 See, e.g., Brief of Christian Legal Society, Association of Christian Schools
International, and National Association of Evangelicals as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants at 13-15, State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 91615-
2) (relying heavily on Desilets to argue that prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination
was not sufficiently compelling).
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Care Act rules requiring businesses to provide contraception relied extensively
on the Ninth Circuit panel's analysis regarding Alaska's law. 2 54 And, as noted
above, in Hobby Lobby itself, Justice Ginsburg's dissent cited to one of these
cases to illustrate the threat that the Court's expansive interpretation of RFRA
would pose to antidiscrimination norms.255 Justice Alito's decision for the Court
stated that eradicating race discrimination would meet a compelling interest
standard, but it made no such assertion regarding sex discrimination, sexual
orientation discrimination, or marital status discrimination.
256
.
The assumption that protection against marital status discrimination is less
compelling than protection against discrimination on the basis of race or sex is
deeply problematic. When first put forward in these early housing cases, it was
not yet firmly established that the choice to engage in non-marital intimacy was
protected as a fundamental liberty. Now it is. Moreover, as Obergefell and
earlier cases emphasized, choices around marriage, sexual intimacy, and
procreation also implicate equality norms protected by the Equal Protection
Clause.257 Thus, where states or the federal government have enacted explicit
protections against marital status discrimination, or taken other steps to advance
and secure these personal liberties (such as guaranteeing access to contraception
in the Affordable Care Act), the underlying interests should clearly be
recognized as compelling, a point I develop further in Part IV.
B. Same-Sex Intimacy
There have been several recent high-profile cases brought by, or on behalf of,
same-sex couples challenging refusals by businesses to provide services in
connection with a marriage or commitment ceremony, including the
Masterpiece Cakeshop case pending (as this Article goes to press) before the
Supreme Court.258 These new cases are similar to the cohabitation cases. As
254 Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 121-22 (D.D.C.
2012). The Tyndale House court asserted that the panel decision had been "reversed on other
grounds"; this is a misrepresentation, in that the decision was actually vacated entirely. See
Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1142. Several briefs in these Affordable Care Act cases cited to the
earlier housing cases, as well. See, e.g., Brief for the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)
(Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191) (citing Massachusetts and
Minnesota housing cases, as well as vacated Ninth Circuit case, to support argument that
businesses may advance religious freedom claims based on being "complicit" in sins of
others).
255 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2804-05 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1985)).
256 Id. at 2783 (majority opinion).
257 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (noting that intimacy, marriage,
and procreation implicate Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
258 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, ¶ 3, 370 P.3d 272, 276, cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (discussing how suit arose when defendant bakery refused to
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discussed below, in state supreme courts and lower courts, there has been
extensive litigation over whether refusing to provide baked goods, photography,
or other goods or services to same-sex couples is an illegal denial of services
based on the "status" of being homosexual, or a permissible response to
"conduct." This threshold question will not be addressed directly in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, because the Court has no authority to review the Colorado Supreme
Court's interpretation of Colorado law; thus, the Court will address only the
petitioner's claim that application of the antidiscrimination law to the situation
violates the petitioner's rights of free speech and religion.259 Accordingly, no
matter how the Supreme Court rules in Masterpiece Cakeshop, some of these
questions will likely continue to be litigated in courts across the country.
1. Discrimination
Again, a threshold question is whether discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is illegal at all. Approximately half of the states do not explicitly
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.260 Thus, in those
states, such denials are presumptively permissible (other than the extent to which
the denial of services could be recognized as a form of discrimination on the
basis of sex, 261 or covered by an applicable local law). But in states or localities
that do have laws explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, plaintiffs reasonably allege that the refusal to serve them violates the
law. The defendant businesses, however, typically argue (among other things)
that they serve gay or lesbian customers in general, but they simply refuse to
work with them on their weddings. Thus, the businesses claim, they oppose
same-sex "marriage" and other formal recognition of same-sex relationships, but
they do not hold any discriminatory animus against individuals on the basis of
their sexual orientation.
For example, in one influential New Mexico Supreme Court case, a
photography business refused to photograph a commitment ceremony for two
women.262 The store emphasized that it was happy to take "portrait photographs"
provide baking services for plaintiffs' wedding); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-
NMSC-040, ¶¶ 7-9, 309 P.3d 53, 59-60 (discussing how suit arose when defendant
photography company refused to photograph plaintiffs' wedding).
259 The state's antidiscrimination law could be considered indirectly if the Court finds that
the law impacts speech protected under the First Amendment and consequently must assess
the importance of the government interest at stake.
260 See Maps ofState Laws and Policies, supra note 10.
261 Such claims would presumably proceed under state public accommodations law, as
federal law prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations does not address sex. That
said, plaintiffs could likely make arguments analogous to those made in the employment
discrimination context that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily
implicates sex discrimination. See cases cited supra note 11 (showing circuit split on this
point).
262 Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, T 7, 309 P.3d at 59-60.
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of gay or lesbian customers, but simply refused to take any photographs that it
understood as "endorsing" same-sex marriage.263 In other words, it asserted that
its refusal to provide services was not discrimination based on the potential
client's "status of being homosexual," but rather disapproval of her "conduct in
openly committing to a person of the same sex." 264 Likewise, in a Washington
Supreme Court case, a florist who refused to provide flowers for a gay couple's
wedding made the same argument, bolstering her claim that she did not
discriminate against gays and lesbians in other contexts by pointing to the fact
that she had provided flowers for the couple frequently during the prior ten years,
and that she had previously hired a gay employee.265 Similar arguments were
made in the lower court decisions of Masterpiece Cakeshop266 and other cases
challenging denial of services. 267
An amicus brief filed in the Washington case by several legal scholars made
the same argument at greater length, suggesting that this interpretation offers a
"sensible reconciliation of the laws and policies promoting both
antidiscrimination and religious and expressive freedom." 268 It argued that the
florist at issue did not have any objection to serving people "who have the
'status' of being homosexual," but that she was simply asking to be excused
from assisting creatively in a ceremony that was contrary to her religious
beliefs.269 It suggests that a pluralistic society depends on "being able to
263 Id. at¶14, 309 P.3d at 61.
264 Id. at 16, 309 P.3d at 61 (emphasis added).
265 Brief for Appellants at 9-10, State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017)
(No. 91615-2).
266 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, ¶ 30, 370 P.3d 272, 280, cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (describing bakery's claim that its refusal to serve couple was
not 'because of their sexual orientation," but rather "'because of' [their] intended conduct").
267 See, e.g., Verified Petition at 15, Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n (Polk Cty.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 046451) (asserting that "although the Odgaards['] . . . religious
beliefs prevent them from planning, facilitating, or hosting same-sex wedding ceremonies at
the Gallery," and accordingly they had refused to permit same-sex couple to rent wedding
venue they operated, they had "never discriminated against anyone at the Gallery because of
his or her sexual orientation"); In re Klein, 34 BOLI 102, 124 (Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus.
2015) (characterizing bakery's claim as "not denying service [to the same-sex couple] because
of Complainants' sexual orientation but rather because they do not wish to participate in their
same sex wedding ceremony").
268 Brief for Legal Scholars in Support of Equality and Religious and Expressive Freedom
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 15, Arlene's Flowers, 389 P.3d at 543
(No. 91615-2).
269 The brief argues in passing that the florist did not "attempt to censure [the couple's]
sexual conduct," in that she referred them to other florists, and accordingly claims that she
did not as a "business matter make any opposition to either the status or the conduct of
homosexuals." Id. at 16-17. However, elsewhere the brief acknowledges that the refusal of
services was undeniably because of their choice to marry, and generally argues that the
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distinguish between conduct of which they disapprove and persons who engage
in that conduct." 270
This argument is flawed. When a business or individual refuses to provide
services to a same-sex couple that it would provide to a different-sex couple, the
key difference between the two couples is their sexual orientation. Thus, the
refusal is properly characterized as a form of discrimination on the basis of their
sexual orientation. This is true even if the individual or business provides other
services to gay or lesbian individuals. And this is true even if the refusal is based
on sincere religious beliefs that homosexual intimacy, or same-sex marriage
specifically, is morally wrong. Recognizing the refusal of service as a form of
discrimination because of sexual orientation does not resolve whether federal or
state protections for religious freedom might excuse compliance with the statute.
But that analysis is properly separated from the threshold question of whether
the refusal to provide services constitutes discrimination.
Notably, courts in this context (in contrast with the cohabitation cases
discussed above and the pregnancy cases discussed below) have generally
rejected these arguments. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court
explained:
[W]hen a law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
that law similarly protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual
orientation. Otherwise we would interpret the [human rights law] as
protecting same-gender couples against discriminatory treatment, but only
to the extent that they do not openly display their same-gender sexual
orientation.271
This statement captures two important points. Not only is the conduct-same-
sex marriage-inextricably tied to sexual orientation, but also failing to protect
the conduct at issue would make the underlying antidiscrimination protections
related to status almost meaningless, in that it would necessitate hiding their
status. In a unanimous decision, the Washington Supreme Court likewise
rejected the florist's claimed distinction between "status and conduct
fundamentally linked to that status." 272 The Colorado Court of Appeals
distinction between "status" and "conduct" makes the florist's actions acceptable. See id. at
17-19.
270 Id. at 19.
271 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 18, 309 P.3d 53, 62.
272 Arlene's Flowers, 389 P.3d at 553.
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employed similar reasoning in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, 273 as did the
Bureau of Labor and Industries in Oregon.274
These courts typically bolster their analysis by citing to constitutional
Supreme Court precedents that had similarly rejected the status/conduct
distinction in the context of sexual orientation as unworkable, including
Lawrence, Obergefell, and Christian Legal Society, as well as Bob Jones
University v. United States,275 which had held that discrimination against
individuals for interracial marriage or dating was a form of race
discrimination. 276 Thus, in these cases challenging the denial of services to
same-sex couples, courts have (so far at least) consistently rejected the claim
that disapproval of same-sex marriage can be distinguished from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. However, these claims continue to be pressed,
and there is a risk that other courts could begin to accept them.277 More
optimistically, these precedents should be used to challenge the similarly flawed
273 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, ¶ 25, 370 P.3d 272, 279, cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) ("[T]he act of same-sex marriage is closely correlated to
Craig's and Mullins' sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did not err when he found that
Masterpiece's refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins was 'because of their
sexual orientation, in violation of [Colorado's antidiscrimination law]."). The highest state
court decision in the case is this mid-level appellate division, because the Colorado Supreme
Court refused to hear an appeal.
274 In re Klein, 34 BOLI 102, 124 (Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. 2015) (stating that "[tihe
forum has already found there to be no distinction" between discrimination on basis of sexual
orientation and desire not to participate in same-sex wedding ceremony).
275 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
276 See, e.g., Arlene's Flowers, 389 P.3d at 552-53 (asserting its rejection of status/conduct
distinction was in accordance with Obergefell, Christian Legal Society, Lawrence, Elane
Photography, and also precedent rejecting the status/conduct distinction in other contexts,
such as Bob Jones University); Craig, 2015 COA 115, ¶ 32, 370 P.3d at 280 (stating that
"Supreme Court has recognized that such distinctions [between person's status and
discrimination based on conduct closely associated with that status] are generally
inappropriate," and citing Christian Legal Society, Lawrence, and Bob Jones University to
support this statement)).
277 In Lexington Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission v. Hands on Originals,
Inc., the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered whether a business's refusal to print t-shirts
for a local LGBT pride event was sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination. No.
2015-CA-000745-MR, 2017 WL 2211381, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017). The three-
judge panel splintered badly. The lead opinion (not joined by either other judge) held it was
permissible because the conduct was not "an activity or conduct exclusively or predominantly
[engaged in] by a protected class ofpeople" and that the business would have refused to print
the t-shirts no matter who asked. Id. The court claimed it was different from refusing to serve
a gay person because of disapproval of same-sex marriage, which it suggested would have
been actionable. Id. at *6. One judge dissented and would have held it impermissible sexual
orientation discrimination. See id. at *9 (Taylor, J., dissenting). The other judge concurred in
the result only, on the ground that the business's refusal to print the t-shirts was protected
under Kentucky's Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See id. at *8 (Lambert, J., concurring).
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distinctions between status and conduct that courts have accepted in cases
addressing the visibility of non-marital heterosexual intimacy.
2. Religious Objectors
The second question in these cases has been whether, notwithstanding the
courts' general holding that the businesses in question have violated laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, noncompliance is
justified by the business's religious beliefs or more general free speech rights.278
Corporate defendants have premised claims on the First Amendment and state
constitutional analogues, as well on state statutes analogous to the federal
RFRA.279 Masterpiece Cakeshop raises these claims directly, and the Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment principles at issue will have ramifications
not only for cases concerning denial of goods and services to same-sex couples,
but also for other individuals whose choices regarding personal intimacy may
conflict with the religious views of their employers, landlords, or service
providers.
Up until now, these claims have been consistently unsuccessful in the same-
sex marriage context. Much of the analysis, and much of the focus of the briefing
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, has turned on whether the refusal to provide services
constitutes compelled speech, or is sufficiently expressive as to merit protection
as speech, issues that are outside the scope of this project.28 0 On the separate
question of whether the interest served by the antidiscrimination laws can justify
any incursion on religion, several courts have held that because the law at issue
is a neutral law of general applicability, only rational basis review applies and
the antidiscrimination law easily meets this standard.281 In the case concerning
the florist in Washington state, the Washington Supreme Court held that the law
could also satisfy strict scrutiny, relying on earlier holdings-including the
278 See, e.g., Craig, 2015 COA 115, ¶ 44, 370 P.3d at 283 ("Masterpiece contends that
the .. . cease and desist order compels speech in violation of the First Amendment by
requiring it to create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings."); Arlene's Flowers, 389 P.3d at
556 ("The first of these defenses is a free speech challenge: Stuzman contends that her floral
arrangements are artistic expressions protected by the state and federal constitutions . . .
279 Arlene's Flowers, 389 P.3d at 556.
280 See, e.g., Craig, 2015 COA 115, T 47-73, 370 P.3d at 283-88; Elane Photography,
2013-NMSC-040, ¶¶ 32-57, 309 P.3d at 65-72; Arlene's Flowers, 389 P.3d at 556-60.
281 See, e.g., Craig, 2015 COA 115, ¶¶ 81-101, 370 P.3d at 289-94 ("Having concluded
that CADA is neutral and generally applicable, we easily conclude that it is rationally related
to Colorado's interest in eliminating discrimination in places of public accommodation.");
Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, T 61-68, 309 P.3d at 73-75 ("We hold that the
NMHRA is a neutral law of general applicability, and, as such it does not offend the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."). This standard is articulated in Employment
Division, Department ofHuman Resources ofOregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990).
It is less protective of religious liberty than the standard required by RFRA; however, because
there is no federal government action at stake in Masterpiece Cakeshop, RFRA has no
bearing.
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Alaska and Minnesota decisions concerning cohabiting couples discussed
above-that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination is compelling.282
The Washington Supreme Court also "emphatically reject[ed]" the argument
that the availability of alternative providers meant that the florists' refusal to
serve the gay couple did not cause real harm, stating that "[t]his case is no more
about access to flowers than civil rights cases in the 1960s were about access to
sandwiches." 283
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, if the Court holds that the fine imposed on the
bakery does merit strict scrutiny because of an impact on freedoms protected by
the First Amendment, it will need to determine whether the antidiscrimination
statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The United States'
amicus brief takes the position that statutes addressing race discrimination can
meet this standard, but statutes addressing sexual orientation discrimination-
at least as applied here-cannot.284 A similar hierarchy of interests was
suggested by the Court in Hobby Lobby. 285 This argument should be rejected.
Courts have long recognized that antidiscrimination statutes serve compelling
purposes, even when they address factors that do not trigger strict scrutiny under
282 See, e.g., Arlene's Flowers, 389 P.3d at 565-66 (concluding "numerous other courts
have heard religious free speech challenges to such laws and upheld them under strict
scrutiny" (citing Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274,281-83 (Alaska
1994); State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 852-54 (Minn. 1985))).
283 Id. at 566 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 32, supra note 265 (No. 91615-2)).
284 Brief for the United States, supra note 22, at 32-33 (arguing laws targeting "race-based
discrimination" are sufficiently compelling to survive heightened First Amendment scrutiny
but that laws targeting discrimination on basis of sexual orientation are not); see also Brief
for North Carolina Values Coalition and the Family Research Council as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 27, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 137
S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111) (indicating support for prior Court decisions upholding civil
rights laws passed to "eradicate America's long history of racial discrimination" but
contending antidiscrimination protections relating to other characteristics cannot justify any
infringement on religious liberty). Notably, leading civil rights groups emphatically reject this
argument. See, e.g., Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. in
Support of Respondents at 19, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 137 S. Ct. at 2290 (No. 16-111)
("Colorado undeniably has a compelling interest in protecting its population-and whatever
classes of persons within that population are in need [of] protection-from discrimination in
public accommodations."); Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 137 S. Ct. at 2290
(No. 16-111) ("States have an interest in eliminating discrimination of all forms, no matter
the motivation, in the enjoyment of places of public accommodation."); Brief of the National
Women's Law Center and Other Groups as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 30,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 137 S. Ct. at 2290 (No. 16-111) ("The important principle that
commercial businesses have no constitutional right to discriminate applies equally to the
context of all groups protected by public accommodation laws."); cf cases cited infra note
286.
285 See supra text accompanying note 125.
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the Equal Protection Clause. 286 The significance of the interest at stake here is
particularly apparent because the Court has emphasized that choices regarding
personal intimacy-including the choice to marry someone of the same-sex-
implicate "fundamentally important" liberty and equality interests protected by
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.287
C. Non-Marital Pregnancy
There have also been several recent cases brought by women who were fired
for being pregnant without being married.288 Again, this should be a two-step
analysis in which courts assess the applicability of pregnancy discrimination law
separate from any considerations that apply specifically to religious employers.
In most of these cases, the employer is a religious organization or school, but
sometimes even entirely secular businesses engage in such discrimination. For
example, a vice president for the Mets baseball team alleged that her boss, upon
learning of her pregnancy, stated that he was "morally opposed" to her having
the baby without being married and that "when she gets a ring, she [would] make
more money and get a bigger bonus." 289 Courts in this context, however, have
devoted comparatively little attention to the specific religious analysis because
they have concluded that any organization-religious or secular-may enforce
a (sex-neutral) policy against non-marital intimacy.
1. Discrimination
The first step in the cohabitation and same-sex marriage contexts is
determining whether there is any applicable antidiscrimination law that could
apply. As noted, relevant federal laws do not address marital status or sexual
orientation explicitly, and only about half of the states have provisions on
point.290 In the unmarried pregnancy context, by contrast, it is clear that federal
286 See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987)
(holding that state has "compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women");
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) ("Assuring women equal access
to ... goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state interests.");
Lumpkin v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498, 1501 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that state has compelling
interest in addressing discrimination based on sexual orientation); see also supra notes 242-
45 and accompanying text (discussing cases that recognized state has compelling interest in
addressing discrimination based on marital status).
287 See supra Section I.A.
288 Many of these cases are also discussed in Clarke, supra note 13, at 18-22. Professor
Clarke is generally critical of these cases as examples of the way the law prioritizes marriage
but she does not focus on the conduct/status distinction or argue that courts are misinterpreting
Title VII as applied in this context.
289 Richard Sandomir, Ex-Mets Executive Sues Jeff Wilpon, Citing Discrimination over
Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 2014, at Bl 6.
290 See sources cited supra note 56.
2 135
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
law does prohibit discrimination against employees on the basis of pregnancy. 291
(This provision was enacted by Congress in 1978 to supersede a Supreme Court
decision that had interpreted Title VII's prohibition on discrimination on the
basis of sex as inapplicable to pregnancy discrimination.) 292 Nonetheless, courts
in these cases typically suggest that they must distinguish between
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, which is illegal, and discrimination on
the basis of having engaged in non-marital sex (or used reproductive
technology), which courts contend is not prohibited by Title VII293 or other
applicable laws. 294 In other words, although they do not frame it in this language,
they once again draw untenable lines between "status" and "conduct."
In one prominent example, the Eleventh Circuit considered a case brought by
a woman who was fired after she admitted to her employer, a Christian school,
that she had become pregnant before she married the father of her baby.295 Her
supervisor justified terminating her by claiming "there are consequences for
disobeying the word of God." 296 The Eleventh Circuit opined that "Title VII
does not protect any right to engage in premarital sex, but as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Title VII does protect the right to get
pregnant." 297 The Sixth Circuit has likewise framed the question as requiring a
determination as to whether the adverse action "constituted discrimination based
on her pregnancy as opposed to a gender-neutral enforcement of the school's
premarital sex policy." 298 This same distinction has been applied by a number of
district courts addressing claims of discrimination against unmarried pregnant
women.299
291 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
292 See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
961, 989-98 (2013).
293 See, e.g., Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1999); Boyd
v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc. 88 F.3d 410, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1996); Dias v. Archdiocese
of Cincinnati, No. 1 1-cv-00251, 2013 WL 360355, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013).
294 In jurisdictions that prohibit marital status discrimination in employment, plaintiffs
could presumably argue that this constitutes unlawful discrimination, as in Richardson v.
Northwest Christian University, 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1152 (D. Or. 2017) (holding that
"Oregon's marital status discrimination law makes it illegal for an employer to impose policy
prohibiting extramarital sex or cohabitation"), discussed infra Section III.C.3. My research
however located surprisingly few reported cases making this argument.
295 Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2012).
296 Id. at 1317-18.
297 Id. at 1319-20 (citations omitted).
298 Cline, 206 F.3d at 658.
299 See, e.g., Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-cv-00251, 2013 WL 360355, at
*5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30,2013) (being "pregnant and unwed" is not grounds for a Title VII claim
per se); Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that
it was up to jury to decide "whether it was pregnancy or fornication that caused the Defendant
to dismiss the Plaintiff").
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Courts in these cases generally suggest that, although it may be murky, the
line between discrimination based on pregnancy and discrimination based on
having engaged in non-marital sex that results in a pregnancy exists. The
Eleventh Circuit, for example, ultimately reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the employer, based on evidence that the woman's
supervisor had expressed concern about how they would handle the logistics of
the maternity leave, as well as distress that the baby had been conceived out of
wedlock.30 But the court made clear that if the employer had simply expressed
opposition to the non-marital sex, it would not constitute a violation of Title
VII.3 0 1
Importantly, courts have held that a policy of firing employees who engage
in non-marital intimacy does violate Title VII if it is not applied evenly to men
and women. 302 It is readily apparent that a woman who is pregnant without being
married has engaged in non-marital sex (or employed assisted reproductive
technology). There is no such visible marker for men who may have engaged in
these activities. Thus, the fact that women are the ones who are likely to face
discrimination is, in some sense, both a bug and a feature under existing law. It
offers a viable hook for winning under the framework that courts have applied-
but it also makes clear that women face a higher risk of job loss as a result of
their intimate choices.303 Some might ultimately be able to win a legal case, but
most will never bring one.
The reasoning adopted by courts in these cases is particularly unpersuasive
because federal employment discrimination law specifically provides that an
300 Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1320-21.
301 Id. at 1319-20; see also Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 48 F. Supp.
3d 1168, 1178 (N.D. Ind. 2014) ("The triable issue is whether Mrs. Herx was nonrenewed
because of her sex, or because of a sincere belief about the morality of in vitro fertilization.").
302 See, e.g., Cline, 206 F.3d at 667 (holding sex discrimination claim viable where school
did not otherwise inquire of male teachers regarding premarital sex); Dias, 2013 WL 360355,
at *5 (indicating Title VII claim is viable if employer did not enforce its policy against
premarital sex in gender neutral manner); cf Aaron Vehling, Indiana Catholic Diocese Must
Pay $2M in IVF Sex Bias Suit, LAw360 (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.1aw360.com/
articles/606761/indiana-catholic-diocese-must-pay-2m-in-ivf-sex-bias-suit (awarding $2
million to teacher based on evidence that school fired her for undergoing in vitro fertilization
and that it had not fired men for participating in IVF).
303 Even if one believes it is possible, as an analytic matter, to distinguish between
disapproval of non-marital sex and disapproval of a pregnancy that was caused by non-marital
sex, it would be very difficult for such a policy to actually be applied in a sex-neutral fashion.
This is akin to a commonly held basis for opposition to the death penalty: an individual may
believe that there are some crimes that are so heinous that death would be warranted as a
penalty, but nonetheless feel that the death penalty should not be implemented because, at
least in this country, it is impossible to apply the death penalty in a race-neutral fashion. My
thanks to Bradley Arehart for helping me articulate this point.
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adverse action that is motivated, even in part, by pregnancy is illegal. 304 It is
nonsensical to suggest that these adverse actions are not at least partially
motivated by pregnancy. As a factual matter, it is almost always the
announcement of the pregnancy that triggers the adverse action. 305 Additionally,
supervisors frequently emphasize how members of the community will respond
to the pregnancy. For example, a first-grade teacher at a Catholic school was
informed that the Diocese had instructed her principal to fire her "before her
pregnancy began to show." 306 These kinds of comments make clear that the
visibility of the pregnancy is often at the root of the employer's disapproval.
Courts should not pretend that a line can be drawn between discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy and discrimination on the basis of non-marital intimacy
that results in a pregnancy, or, at a minimum, they should scrutinize the evidence
extremely carefully to assess whether there is reason to believe the pregnancy
played at least some role in the decisionmaking, even if other factors also played
a role.307
304 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) ("The terms 'because of
sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy .... ); id. § 2000e-2(m) (prohibiting consideration of sex as motivating factor for
any employment practice). A showing that the employer would have taken the same action in
the absence of the prohibited factor can preclude the award of certain remedies, such as money
damages, but it does not absolve the employer of liability. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
305 See, e.g., Complaint and Demand for July Trial at 4, Daly v. St. Elizabeth Ann Seton
Catholic Sch., No. 3:14-cv-0 1029 (M.D. Fla. dismissed Nov. 24, 2014), ECF No. 1 (alleging
that when plaintiff, who was unmarried, informed principal of her school she was pregnant,
he stated he needed to confer with Diocese "regarding her pregnancy" and that Diocese
instructed school to terminate plaintiff); Complaint at 2-3, supra note 135 (alleging that
employer knew plaintiff had other non-marital children, but when she told her supervisor of
new pregnancy she was immediately terminated); cf Cline, 206 F.3d at 667 (holding sex
discrimination claim viable where pregnancy alone signaled teacher engaged in premarital
sex).
306 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 305, at 4; see also Cline, 206 F.3d at
656 ("[P]arents in the community have serious concerns about a teacher who marries and is
expecting a child 5 months after the wedding date.").
30' For this reason, even evidence that a policy against non-marital sex is sometimes
enforced against non-pregnant employees should not be sufficient to grant summary judgment
to an employer, so long as there is reason to believe (as there typically will be) that the
pregnancy played at least some role in the decision. Cf Richardson v. Nw. Christian Univ.,
242 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1149 (D. Or. 2017) (denying summary judgment in this situation).
Relatedly, it is irrelevant whether evidence that a termination was premised on the plaintiffs
being "pregnant and unwed" is classified as direct or circumstantial evidence. Cf Dias, 2013
WL 360355, at *4 (considering this question). Although litigants and lower courts sometimes
suggest otherwise, the Supreme Court long ago made clear that either kind of evidence may
be used to establish a violation of the "motivating factor" language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m). See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003) ("[D]irect evidence of
discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases .... ).
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2. Religious Objectors
To the extent that special issues apply to (some positions at) religious
employers, those questions should be handled separately from the question of
how the Pregnancy Discrimination Act applies to non-marital pregnancies in
general. But these cases include very little discussion of how Title VII should
apply to religious employers specifically.
The older decisions barely consider the issue at all, other than to observe that
the issue in the cases was pregnancy/sex discrimination, rather than religious
discrimination.308 This may seem obvious, but it is an important point. Religious
entities might seek to frame the matter as a form of "religious" discrimination
and thus within an exception included within Title VII, which permits such
organizations to discriminate on the basis of "religion"-that is, they can prefer
individuals who adhere to the organization's religious beliefs over those with
different beliefs. 309 But religious organizations are not given carte blanche to
discriminate on the basis of sex, race, or other grounds. Because the argument
in these cases is that women are being treated unequally, even under ostensibly
sex-neutral rules regarding non-marital intimacy, they concern sex
discrimination rather than religious discrimination. Thus, the general exception
for religious organizations does not apply.310
More recent cases typically include separate consideration of whether the
position involved fits within the "ministerial" exception. As explained in Section
I.C, this is a judicially-created exception to antidiscrimination laws which holds
that courts may not review the employment relationship between a religious
organization and its ministers.3 11 The exception would create the latitude for a
religious organization to fire a minister because she became pregnant outside of
marriage. Even though I argue this would constitute sex discrimination, it would
be permissible, just as it is permissible for the Catholic Church to refuse to hire
women as priests at all. 312 The First Amendment (properly, I believe) assures
religious denominations the freedom to make such determinations in accordance
with the tenets of their faith.
But these cases help highlight why it is important to limit the ministerial
exception to persons who serve a true ministerial role. One of the cases discussed
308 See, e.g., Cline, 206 F.3d at 658 ("Because discrimination based on pregnancy is a clear
form of discrimination on the basis of sex, religious schools cannot discriminate based on
pregnancy."); Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996)
("Title VII still applies ... to a religious institution charged with sex discrimination.").
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
310 For the same reason, courts should not accept any argument that categorically excluding
unmarried pregnant women can fit within the provision that permits organizations to consider
religion when it is a bona fide occupational qualification for the position.
311 See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
312 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189
(2012).
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above was brought by a cook at a community child care center, 313 a position that
clearly cannot meet this standard. In several of these cases, defendants have
pushed for exceptionally broad interpretations of the exception-e.g., that every
teacher in a religious school should be considered a minister-but courts, so far
at least, have properly rejected such claims.3 14
There is an additional way in which religious entities' efforts to bring more
employees within the scope of the ministerial exception could affect the analysis.
As discussed above, in the wake of Obergefell and Hosanna-Tabor, religious
and religiously-affiliated employers have been increasingly vigilant about
asking employees to sign morals clauses, which often include promises to forego
non-marital intimacy.3 15 Research by Lauren Edelman and others has identified
a disturbing tendency among courts to assume that the mere existence of an
antidiscrimination or harassment policy guarantees the absence of illegal
discrimination, rather than scrutinizing such policies to determine whether they
are effective.3. 16 These findings suggest that courts might likewise rubberstamp
a morals clause policy as sufficient to show an evenhanded opposition to non-
marital sex, without determining whether it is really enforced in an evenhanded
manner.317 Thus, even if courts continue to police the line on the "ministerial
exception," these kinds of policies could increase the likelihood that employers
would escape liability on the pregnancy discrimination question. It will be
essential that litigants demonstrate that merely having a policy on paper is not
sufficient to demonstrate that the rule is pregnancy neutral; the nature of the
problem suggests that it will almost certainly not be pregnancy neutral.
Finally, there might be instances where religious organizations or religiously
operated businesses could assert claims under RFRA or state analogues. Courts
weighing such claims should explicitly recognize that employers' religious
liberty claims must be balanced against the longstanding commitment to
eradicating pregnancy discrimination in the workplace and the individual
woman's fundamental right to make choices regarding personal intimacy.
313 Complaint at 2, supra note 135.
314 See, e.g., Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-cv-00251, 2013 WL 360355, at
*4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (rejecting defendant's assertion that all teachers are "role models
and therefore 'ministers"' and asserting that because teacher was not Catholic, she could not
"genuinely be considered a 'minister' of the Catholic faith").
315 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
316 See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference
to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. Soc. 888 (2011).
317 Cf Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1178 (N.D.
Ind. 2014) (observing "jury might well agree, after hearing evidence about the Church's view
of in vitro fertilization, that an employer with so strong a view of this particular infertility
treatment would discharge anyone involved with it, male or female").
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3. A Better Approach
A recent district court decision serves as a promising counterpoint to the cases
discussed above, in that it expresses a more nuanced understanding of how status
and conduct interact in this context, bringing together the housing discrimination
cases discussed in Section III.A and the gay rights cases discussed in Section
III.B. 318 Coty Richardson was an exercise science professor at Northwest
Christian University ("NCU").319 She was unmarried, and when she emailed her
supervisor to let him know she was pregnant, he informed her that she had three
options: she could marry the baby's father before the beginning of the next
academic school year, "admit that she had made a 'mistake' and stop living with
the baby's father, or lose her job." 320 Richardson sued, alleging both pregnancy
discrimination and violation of Oregon's law prohibiting marital status
discrimination, along with tort and contract based claims. 321 First, the court
concluded that the ministerial exception did not apply, reasoning, correctly, that
even though she, like all faculty at the school, "was expected to integrate her
Christianity into her teaching and demonstrate a maturing Christian faith .. . any
religious function was wholly secondary to her secular role." 322
On the pregnancy discrimination claim, the court followed the reasoning of
other decisions, cited above, to hold that a "prohibition on extramarital
sex/cohabitation does not automatically constitute pregnancy discrimination
under Title VII."323 But it noted that NCU did not take "affirmative steps" to
find out whether employees complied with this prohibition; rather, it only
enforced its policy when it learned through "rumor or self-reporting that an
employee is having extramarital sex/cohabiting," or when it learned through
"rumor, self-reporting, or observation" that an unmarried employee was
pregnant.324 Accordingly, even though NCU could-rather unusually-identify
two non-pregnant employees (one male, one female) who had been told they
would lose their job if they did not marry a cohabiting partner,325 the court
denied NCU's motion for summary judgment on the pregnancy discrimination
claim. 326 The court opined that a reasonable jury could conclude that the school's
"chosen enforcement method will necessarily and obviously lead to
31 Richardson v. Nw. Christian Univ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (D. Or. 2017).
319 Id. at 1139.
320 Id. at 1140-41.
321 Id. at 1138.
322 Id. at 1145.
323 Id. at 1149 (citing Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir.
2000); Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012)).
324 Id. at 1148 (emphasis added).
325 Id. at 1142. In those instances, the male and female employees married their partners
within days, rather than lose their jobs. The school also fired a faculty member who had had
a sexual relationship with a student, in violation of the school's fraternization policy, as well
as its general prohibition on non-marital intimacy. Id.
326 Id. at 1149.
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disproportionate enforcement against pregnant women," and also that NCU's
focus on the visibility of the pregnancy suggested it was "less concerned about
its employees having sex outside of marriage and more concerned about people
knowing its employees were having sex outside of marriage-a concern that
arguably amounts to animus against pregnant women." 327
On the marital status claim, the arguments put forward by the parties echoed
those in the earlier housing discrimination cases: Richardson asserted she was
fired because of her marital status, in that she was explicitly told that she could
keep her job if she married her partner, while the school contended that she was
fired "because of her conduct," in that it would have been happy to continue to
employ her if she remained single, but not if she remained single and continued
to live with her partner.328 The court reviewed the split in the case law discussed
in Section III.A and concluded that the text of the statute was ambiguous as to
whether it applied in this context.329 The court further noted that, as discussed
above, most of the courts that had narrowly construed "marital status" provisions
to not apply to cohabiting couples had done so to reconcile the provisions with
anti-fornication or cohabitation statutes, but that Oregon lacked comparable
criminal prohibitions on intimate conduct. 330 (As discussed above, even in the
few states that retain such laws on the books, they can no longer be enforced and
thus should not be grounds for reading the "marital status" provisions unduly
narrowly.) Finally, the court relied on the gay rights cases discussed in Sections
II.C and III.B, 331 concluding that although they did not directly resolve the
question, they helped underscore that "conduct and status are often inextricably
linked." 332 This reality, combined with the general canon that remedial statutes
are to be broadly construed to promote their objectives, led the court ultimately
to conclude that "a policy against extramarital sex/cohabitation effectively
discriminates on the basis of marital status," and thus violated the Oregon law.
333
327 Id. In a letter, the supervisor explained that the school's actions were because "[her]
marital status is generally known and [her] pregnancy will be obvious to all, it [would] be
apparent to faculty and students [she had] engaged in a lifestyle that does not reflect faith
based conduct consistent with NCU goals or expectations." Id. at 1141; see also Complaint at
8, Richardson, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1132 (No. 15-cv-20442) (alleging supervisor had told her
that "'the problem' with her pregnancy . .. was that she was going to be 'showing' soon and
that many of the students and staff would start to 'ask questions"').
328 Richardson, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (explaining that defendant asserted that her
conduct of living with her partner outside of marriage was reason for her discharge).
329 Id.
330 Id. at 1151.
331 Id. (citing Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); State
v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548-49 (Wash. 2017)).
332 Id. at 1152 (quoting Veenstra v. Washtenaw Country Club, 645 N.W.2d 643, 650
(Mich. 2002) (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
333 Id.
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Because the case subsequently settled, there was never a jury determination
of whether the school's policy actually did discriminate against women.334
However, the careful reasoning the court employed on both the pregnancy
discrimination and the marital status discrimination claims offers a useful model
for other courts grappling with these questions.
IV. ENHANCING PROTECTIONS FOR INTIMATE LIBERTIES
Part III focused on existing law. It argued that where legislative bodies have
enacted protections against discrimination on the basis of marital status, sexual
orientation, and pregnancy, courts should not employ unreasonably narrow
interpretations premised on false distinctions between status and conduct to deny
protection. This Part offers some initial thoughts on the larger normative
question of why such provisions are essential. It argues that addressing
discrimination by private actors is a necessary element of ensuring individuals
have the personal autonomy to exercise the intimate liberties our Constitution
promises, and it suggests that legislatures should consider adopting more general
protections against discrimination on the basis of intimate liberties.
One of the groundbreaking aspects of the decision in Lawrence was its
recognition that state condemnation of forms of intimacy that were associated
with gays and lesbians-i.e., criminal statutes prohibiting sodomy-justified
discrimination against gays and lesbians in the private sector.335 This included
specific consequences in civil law: for example, allegations of homosexual
conduct were used to discredit a parent's claim in contested custody cases. 336
But the deeper, broader point is that criminalization denotes moral disapproval,
and thus it actually encourages discrimination more generally throughout
society.337
The interaction works in reverse as well. Permitting private discrimination
based on intimate choices curtails individuals' ability to exercise fundamental
constitutional liberties. The potential loss of a job can certainly be as significant
a deterrent as the (usually small) possibility of criminal prosecution.338 Looked
334 See Docket, Richardson 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1132 (No. 6:15-cv-01886).
335 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (discussing how criminalizing sodomy invites
discrimination).
336 See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (holding that "father's continuous
exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit [same-sex] relationship renders him an unfit
and improper custodian as a matter of law").
337 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the
law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.").
338 See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GovERNMENT: How EMPLOYERS RULE
OuR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON'T TALK ABOUT IT) (2017) (arguing that private employers have
sweeping authoritarian power over employees' lives); cf Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous.
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996) (noting that requiring Sabbatarian to avoid conflict
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at through this lens, the allegations in the pregnancy discrimination cases
discussed in Section III.C suggest that supervisors routinely feel empowered to
place rather shocking demands on their employees. For example, when Shana
Daly, a social studies and reading teacher at a Catholic school, announced her
pregnancy, the pastor of the parish allegedly told her that she would need to
marry the father of her unborn child within four weeks, or lose her job.3 39 Leigh
Castergine, the former Mets employee, was told by her boss that "when she gets
a ring, she will make more money and get a bigger bonus." 340 And as noted
above, Coty Richardson was told that she would be fired unless she married her
partner or admitted she had "made a 'mistake' and terminated her twelve-year
relationship with him.34 1
In the Richardson case, the school's defense on the pregnancy discrimination
claim relied in large part on identifying two non-pregnant employees who had
also been told that they would lose their jobs if they continued a cohabiting
relationship. 342 Rather than sue, each of those individuals had simply complied
with the demand, getting married within a few days.343 This evidence clearly
helped bolster the school's claim that its policy against non-marital cohabitation
did not violate Title VII (although I believe the court was right to deny the
employer's motion for summary judgment, as there was also evidence
suggesting that pregnant women were more likely to be subject to the policy).
However, the more significant fact may be that these individuals were pushed
into marriages by their employer. 3 " In other words, they made the "choice" to
marry-a choice that the Supreme Court has characterized as a "profound
commitment" of "transcendent importance" that is "inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy" and "among the most intimate that an individual can
make" 345-to satisfy their employer. Even if the policy was applied in a truly
sex neutral manner, there is an injury here that I believe antidiscrimination law
should address.
between his religion and work by "quitting work and foregoing compensation .. . is not a
realistic solution for someone who lives on the wages earned through personal labor").
339 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 305, at 4.
340 See Sandomir, supra note 289.
341 Richardson v. Nw. Christian Univ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1141 (D. Or. 2017); see also
Complaint, supra note 327, at 8.
342 Richardson, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1142.
343 Id.
31 In at least one of the examples, the couple was already engaged when they began
cohabiting, id., and thus NCU's demand likely only changed the timing of the marriage.
Nonetheless, many couples carefully choose when and where to marry and plan a ceremony
that includes their family and friends. By contrast, after being told he would lose his job
because he had moved in with his fianc6e, this faculty member "spent a few nights on a
colleague's couch and then the couple obtained a marriage license." Id.
345 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594, 2599 (2015).
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Some might argue that the harm is less extreme, and the possibility of
interfering with intimate choices is less likely, when the discrimination at issue
is the denial of services at a public accommodation or the denial of housing
rather than loss of a job. Certainly, a couple who has decided to get married is
very unlikely to abandon that plan simply because a bakery or florist refuses to
work with them. In most instances, they will be able to find alternative providers.
That said, in some regions of the country this could be difficult. Indeed, Douglas
Laycock, one of the most prominent proponents of expansive religious
exemptions, was quite open about the challenge that this might pose, suggesting
that it might mean that "same-sex couples planning a wedding might be forced
to pick their merchants carefully, like black families driving across the South
half a century ago." 346 And there are situations where the denial of services could
have more devastating consequences, such as a Catholic hospital providing
emergency care that could refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage. 347
Even if alternative providers exist, the denial of services nonetheless causes a
real and significant harm. The Senate committee report for the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 made this point eloquently:
The primary purpose of [the Civil Rights Act], then, is to solve this
problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies
denials of equal access to public establishments. Discrimination is not
simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation,
frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is
told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public . . . .348
This theme has been echoed and developed by courts applying and enforcing
statutory laws precluding discrimination in public accommodations. 349 Just as it
31 Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS 169 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell
Wison eds., 2008). To some extent, this expectation likely reflects the fact that it was written
a decade ago. As support for same-sex marriage has grown, this risk has almost certainly
decreased.
347 Currently, this problem is partially mitigated by regulations issued in 2010 that apply
to most hospitals and that permit patients who have sufficient capacity to designate whom
they will receive as visitors. See 40 C.F.R. § 482.13(h) (2012) (requiring hospitals to inform
patients of right to receive visitors, including same-sex domestic partners, and confirming that
all visitors enjoy equal visitation privileges according to patient's preferences). However,
hospitals might seek religious exemptions from compliance, similar to the exemptions sought
by religious entities for issues related to contraceptives and abortion. Cf Eternal World TV
Network, Inc. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1137
(11th Cir. 2016) (addressing claims brought by Catholic organizations alleging Affordable
Care Act's provisions covering contraceptives violated RFRA and Free Exercise Clause).
348 S. REP. No. 88-872, at 16 (1963).
349 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291 (1964) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) ("The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,... as the Court
recognizes, . . . is the vindication of human dignity and not mere economics."); see also, e.g.,
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causes humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment when services are denied on
the basis of race, it causes humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment when
services are denied on the basis of intimate choices. 350
But my point here is not simply that discrimination on the basis of intimate
liberties is hurtful. Discrimination on many grounds-poverty, or disability, or
wholly arbitrary grounds, like an aversion to Cubs fans-is hurtful.
Antidiscrimination law is premised on legislative judgments about what factors
merit statutory protection. They reflect local priorities and political whims; they
do not (necessarily) track constitutional norms. There is no formal rule for
factors that need to be weighed or processes that need to be observed.
Nonetheless, there are several factors that are at least implicit in debates over the
need for antidiscrimination laws. These include the harms such discrimination
causes, the extent to which a particular factor gives rise to discrimination, the
costs of interfering with the autonomy of businesses to make their own
decisions, the extent to which the marketplace might effectively address any
irrational biases without requiring regulation, and the expressive value of a clear
statement against certain forms of discrimination.
Looking at this list suggests a strong case for enacting more robust protections
for intimate liberties. In constitutional cases, the Supreme Court has been right
to recognize that choices regarding personal intimacy and family formation are
integral to personal autonomy and dignity. These choices are central to how we
define ourselves and our roles in our communities. The factual scenarios that
gave rise to the cases discussed above-marrying someone of the same sex,
living with an intimate partner, or becoming pregnant without being married-
make private choices around intimacy both visible and public. Without a shield
against private discrimination, these choices cannot be made freely. The injury
caused by this kind of discrimination is particularly acute, for the same reason
that the Court has recognized that the freedom to make such choices implicates
"fundamental" liberties protected by the Constitution. Moreover, as noted
above, the rapid shifts in family form and choices around sexual intimacy and
marriage remain sharply polarizing, suggesting there is reason to believe such
discrimination is relatively prevalent. The cases described in Part III are likely
only the tip of the iceberg, in that few individuals who are subject to such
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) ("[Gender discrimination] thereby both
deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide
participation in political, economic, and cultural life."); Brief of Public Accommodation Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 27-35, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111) (reviewing and explaining
case law establishing enforcement of public accommodation laws is essential to protecting
equality and dignity, even when market alternatives exist).
3s0 See, e.g., In re Klein, 34 BOLI 102, 125 (Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. 2015) (detailing
how bakery's refusal to provide cake for lesbian wedding, on grounds that it would be
"abomination," caused her to become severely depressed and "question[] whether there was
something inherently wrong with [her] sexual orientation").
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discrimination will sue, and even fewer of those suits will result in published
decisions. There are, of course, costs to interfering with businesses' autonomy
to make decisions, but, at least outside the context of religious organizations, the
harms posed to individual victims seem likely to outweigh the costs on the other
side. The market is unlikely to correct fully for such discrimination, 351 and there
is important expressive value in laws proclaiming certain kinds of discrimination
to be impermissible and unacceptable.
These factors suggest, at a minimum, that states that have not yet enacted laws
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation
should do so, and Congress should follow suit (unless the Supreme Court holds
definitively that the latter category is unlawful under existing statutory
prohibitions on sex discrimination). Legislative bodies should also consider
adopting more explicit and general protections for the exercise of (lawful)
"intimate liberties." These could be modeled on existing state laws that protect
employees against being penalized for any lawful out-of-work conduct.352 Or
they could be more narrowly drawn provisions that specifically refer to the kinds
of choices around intimacy, procreation, and marriage that the Supreme Court
has recognized merit special protection under our Constitution. Explicitly
invoking conduct-rather than speaking in the language of status-would avoid
the definitional conundrums that have tripped up the courts.353 It would also
351 It is true that boycotts have been effective against some discriminatory laws, but service
providers who have received publicity after refusing to serve gay customers have also seen
financial benefits. See, e.g., Justin Wm. Moyer, Indiana Pizza Shop Won't Cater Gay
Wedding, Gets Over $50K from Supporters, WASH. PosT (Apr. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/02/indianas-memories-
pizza-wouldnt-cater-gay-wedding-gets-40k-in-crowdfunding/?utmterm=.c0e98 11 ea894
[https://perma.cc/82NZ-SHF5].
352 See Pagnattaro, supra note 165, at 640-60 (2004). However, several of these statutes
state that employers may take adverse actions against employees if the conduct conflicts with
the employer's business interests. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2017) (restricting
adverse actions for employee's non-work conduct "which is not in direct conflict with the
essential business-related interests of the employer"). This is a potentially large loophole, in
that it suggests that reputational harm might justify adverse actions. It is quite different from
the norm in antidiscriniination law, where it has long been established that customer
preferences cannot justify discrimination. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the
preferences and prejudices of customers to determine whether . .. discrimination was valid.
Indeed, it was, to large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.").
3 This could also avoid potential thorny questions of coverage. For example, some
individuals engage in same-sex intimacy but do not identify as gay or bisexual. See, e.g., Jesse
Singal, How Straight Men Who Have Sex with Men Explain Their Encounters, N.Y. MAG.
(Feb. 14, 2017), http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2017/02/how-straight-men-explain-their-
same-sex-encounters.html [https://perma.cc/53Y2-VYED]. If an employer fired an employee
for this conduct, it is not clear whether he would be protected under existing laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Presumably, such conduct would be
protected under a law that specifically proscribed discrimination against individuals for their
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
align more obviously with the way the constitutional interests have been defined.
Thus, if businesses, individuals, or organizations asked to be excused from
compliance on religious grounds, it would be readily apparent that there were
fundamentally important interests underlying the claims on both sides.
I am not, in this Article, attempting to establish precisely what the scope of
antidiscrimination provisions related to "intimate liberties" should be, or
whether there might be certain circumstances where differential treatment is
justified. Certainly, such protections could easily encompass, for example,
protections from discrimination for choices regarding birth control or abortion
(to the extent that such provisions are not already encompassed within existing
protections against sex/pregnancy discrimination). 354 In some contexts,
however, there might be countervailing business reasons for policies that
interfere with intimate liberties that did not exist in the kinds of cases discussed
in Part III (an example of this might be a policy prohibiting nepotism). Similarly,
legislatures might decide that it should be illegal to take adverse actions against
employees because they engage in non-marital intimacy, but that employers
should be able to provide benefits to married couples (such as health insurance
for a spouse) that they do not provide to unmarried couples.3 55 That said, I would
strongly advocate that antidiscrimination protections for gay and lesbian couples
seeking marriage-related services be understood as part of a larger interest in
protecting autonomous choices regarding intimacy in general, the fundamental
interest that was recognized in Lawrence, rather than a particularized right
regarding marriage, as it (arguably) was in Obergefell.
The key here is that, as noted in Part I, Obergefell rested in part on the
humiliation the Court assumed that same-sex couples and their children would
feel at being excluded from marriage.356 In one sense, I whole-heartedly agree.
choices regarding personal intimacy. My thanks to Naomi Schoenbaum for identifying this
issue.
354 See, e.g., Koran Addo, Bill Protecting Women Against Discrimination for Having an
Abortion Passes in St. Louis City Hall, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 11, 2017),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/bill-protecting-women-against-discri
mination-for-having-an-abortion-passes/articleebbfb676-ef5c-560a-ba0c-3b9a3a9672al.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/DFT9-77ME] (describing St. Louis ordinance adding reproductive
health decisions to city's anti-discrimination ordinance); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, No. 915.003, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy
Discrimination and Related Issues (2015) ("[I]t would be unlawful for a manager to pressure
an employee to have an abortion, or not to have an abortion, in order to retain her job, get
better assignments, or stay on a path for advancement.").
355 An employer might have legitimate interests in limiting such benefits to couples who
have formalized their commitment through marriage; however, it might be possible to use
factors other than marriage (such as length of relationship) to distinguish casual relationships
from long-term committed relationships.
356 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) ("Without the recognition,
stability, and predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their
families are somehow lesser.").
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It is undoubtedly deeply humiliating to be told by one's government that one's
relationship does not merit the same respect as a different-sex marriage. But the
Court's decision was riddled with statements suggesting a different source of
humiliation: that same-sex couples and their children would be "humiliated" by
being unable to differentiate themselves from (less worthy) non-marital
families.357 This aspect of the decision is deeply troubling. It reflects the extent
to which non-marital intimacy, and particularly non-marital child-bearing,
remains stigmatized, even as it has become increasingly prevalent in many
sectors of society.3 58
Part III demonstrated how, in each of the three contexts discussed, corporate
defendants sought to justify their discriminatory treatment as a legitimate
response to "conduct" rather than illegal discrimination based on a protected
"status." Courts have (so far, at least) rejected that claim when advanced in the
context of same-sex couples seeking marriage-related services but permitted it
to succeed in cases concerning non-marital pregnancies or cohabiting couples.
It is difficult to know precisely why this pattern has emerged, but it is certainly
possible it reflects a hierarchy in which marital families (expanded to now
include same-sex as well as different-sex headed families) are offered more
respect and protection than non-marital families.
It is a credit to the efficacy of the LGBT advocacy movement that legislative
proposals implicating discrimination against same-sex couples or trans-people
spur high-profile boycotts and protests.359 There is a danger, however, that the
3 This phenomenon may appear in the unmarried pregnancy context, where lesbian
women fired for non-marital pregnancies have sometimes argued that they should not face
sanction because their pregnancies were "planned" with a partner, and facilitated through
artificial reproductive technology, rather than the careless result of unprotected sex. See, e.g.,
Lydia Warren, Lesbian Teacher Who Was Fired at Catholic School Because She Was
Pregnant and Unmarried Gives Birth to Son, DAILYMAIL.COM (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2589899/Fired-Catholic-school-teacher-gives-birth
-son.html [https://perma.cc/7855-D6FG] (describing how teacher's GoFundMe page,
established to help fund litigation, emphasized that teacher was in a "long-term, committed
relationship" and that pregnancy was "hard-fought and very much wanted"); Teacher Fired
for Pregnancy Sues Butte Catholic Schools, MONT. STANDARD (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://mtstandard.com/news/local/teacher-fired-for-pregnancy-sues-butte-catholic-schools/
article_9f3df7ce-29a7-l 1e4-805b-001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/ZF3A-2J2C]
(explaining how teacher's artificial insemination led to her discharge by Catholic school).
3 See supra Section I.B.
m See, e.g., Andrew Bender, Indiana's Religious Freedom Act Cost Indianapolis $60
Million in Lost Revenue, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender
/2016/01/3 1/indianas-religious-freedom-act-cost-indianapolis-60-million-in-lost-revenue/#1
8dafe402e2a [https://perma.cc/ZGH9-SXXM] (describing how boycott against Indiana when
it passed Religious Freedom Restoration Act led to the Act's being amended one week later);
Sandhya Somashekhar, Georgia Governor Vetoes Religious Freedom Bill Criticized as Anti-
Gay, WASH. PosT (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2016/03/28/georgia-govemor-to-veto-religious-freedom-bill-criticized-as-anti-gay/?utm
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narrow focus on what the expansion of exemptions for religious objectors will
mean for the LGBT community will obscure the equally pressing danger that
exemptions pose to heterosexual couples who engage in non-marital intimacy
and non-marital childbearing. As noted in Part I, public disapproval of these
other intimate choices remains at least as high as public disapproval of same-sex
parenting.360 If courts adopt the hierarchy suggested by Obergefell-privileging
and protecting married same-sex couples while disparaging non-marital families
more generally-there is a very real risk that courts will continue to robustly
interpret prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
hold that such laws meet the compelling interest standard under RFRA or
constitutional provisions related to religious freedom, while failing to protect the
interests that are at stake when non-marital families face discrimination. Given
the stark racial and class-based disparities in non-marital birthrates, 36 1 such
discrimination would be especially harmful to minority communities whose
interests have long been at the heart of the antidiscrimination project more
generally. 362
CONCLUSION
In the culture wars raging around religious objections to same-sex marriage,
claims of autonomy-back-stopped by the Constitution's commitment to
religious freedom-have been made largely on behalf of religious organizations
and business owners seeking exemptions from antidiscrimination laws. But
claims of autonomy-back-stopped by the Constitution's commitment to
intimate liberties-could likewise be advanced on behalf of employees, tenants,
or other members of the public seeking to enforce antidiscrimination guarantees.
This is relevant not only for the LGBT community but also for others who
challenge traditional norms around intimacy, such as cohabiting couples or
unmarried pregnant women.
The constitutional law concerning intimate liberties recognizes a synergy
between substantive due process doctrine and equal protection doctrine.
Recognizing the interplay between equality and liberty is essential when
interpreting private antidiscrimination law as well. This analysis should help
debunk the putative distinction that courts make between "status" and "conduct"
in these cases, and it should strengthen the claim that prohibitions on
term-.c245ae5004e7 [https://perma.cc/7FC4-W2BR] (describing how Georgia governor
vetoed RFRA bill in response to threats of boycott by National Football League, several
Hollywood studios, and other businesses).
" See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
361 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
362 Cf Joslin, supra note 13, at 822-23 (suggesting discrimination against non-marital
families may be "used-consciously or unconsciously-as a pretext for race discrimination").
At a minimum, litigants should be able to bring disparate impact claims to challenge such
policies. However, courts' reluctance to credit societal statistics and general deference to
claimed business justifications suggest such claims would rarely be successful.
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discrimination on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation, and pregnancy
are narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests. Modem
constitutional law, which makes clear that adult consensual sexual intimacy can
no longer lead to criminal sanction, emphasizes the fundamental importance of
being able to make individual choices regarding intimacy. But true liberty
requires protecting individuals from discrimination in the private sector-you
should not be fired, lose your housing, or be denied services simply because of
whom you love.
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